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often portrayed as devoid of military press control, can be seen as an
exception, rather than the rule. Further, the Sidle Commission as well as the
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the press policy of the Vietnam War. A close examination of USCENTCOM's
public affairs guidance suggests that the makers of DOD and theater press
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I. INTRODUCTION: NATIONAL SECURITY VS. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Every newspaper now asks itself with respect to every story, "Is it news?'
All I suggest is that you add the question, "Is it in the national interests?'
-President John F. Kennedy
(Metzner, 1972, p. 72)
A. DEFINING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1. Reasonable Limits
Since the beginning of the Republic, national security interests have
been at odds with the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press
—
especially in time of war. Although the First Amendment clearly states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of the press," by no means
does that grant absolute freedom. The First Amendment also provides for
the "free exercise" of religion, but to quote the sarcastic view of one journalist,
"That right does not permit Satan worshipers to sacrifice virgins in public
squares." (Heid, 1986, p. 42) "Freedom" implies no limits, yet reasonable
limits are the inherent byproduct of any rights within society—it is a matter
of balancing individual rights against those of society as a whole. National
security is as fundamental a collective concern to the United States as the
individual concepts of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The friction
lies less in substance than in scope: Where do press freedoms end and U.S.
security interests begin?
During the Persian Gulf War the question was debated fiercely among
military and government officials and press representatives alike. The debate
was shaped in part by an incomplete image of the past, centering on
generalizations about the press coverage of the Vietnam War. This thesis
will explore those generalizations as well as the experiences of previous wars,
emphasizing the proposition that although the coverage of the Persian Gulf
War was unique in many ways, this occurred because of and not in spite of
the perennial battle between pen and sword. The press policy that emanated
from this war was in effect a product of historical evolution.
To fully comprehend the evolution of military press relations it is
important first to examine the meaning of "freedom of the press" as regards
U.S. national security interests, as well as the rights and responsibilities this
freedom entails. Whereas the First Amendment specifically bars Congress
from enacting laws that abridge the freedom of the press, it has not
constitutionally deterred Congress from enacting laws regarding the press.
(O'Brien, 1981, p. 48) Further, national security interests have provided the
bulwalk of legal precedent. The implications for military-press controls
should be readily apparent. The framework from which military-press
relations have developed and the pertinent issues therein require a review of
the origins of the First Amendment in U.S. political thought.
2. The Bill of Rights
The inclusion of a bill of rights was pursuant to the ratification of the
United States Constitution. It was added less because of a universal belief in
its necessity than as a compromise in the struggle between the Anti-
Federalists, who in opposition to the new Constitution insisted on a bill of
rights, and the Federalists, who supported it in order to pass the new charter
of government. It is not surprising that debates on the meaning of a free
press guarantee were vague and lacked thorough exposition. (Lofton, 1980, pp.
9-11) Hamilton, leader of the Federalist Party, defended its initial omission
on these very ground. In the Federalist Paper LXXXIV, he argued
What signifies a declaration that "The Liberty of the Press shall be
inviolably preserved?" What is the Liberty of the press? Who can give
it any definition which does not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I
hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security,
whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any Constitution
respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the
general spirit of the people and of the Government. (Mott, 1962, p. 6)
Nonertheless, the Bill of Rights was an important issue in the first
session of Congress, and the First Amendment, regardless of its definitive
limits, was meant to be an additional structural provision to harness the
powers of the federal government within its prescribed boundaries. The
framers of the Constitution feared the powers inherent in centralized
government, as evidenced by the numerous checks and balances written into
the system—freedom of the press was meant to be an extension of this.
Moreover, press freedom was viewed as being closely linked to the idea of
representative self-government. (Powe, 1990, pp. 47-49) This view was
expounded by James Madison in 1922:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to
be their own governors must arm themselves with the power
knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information
or the means to get it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps
both. (Daniels, 1985, p. 1)
By including the First Amendment in the Constitution, freedom of
the press could not be restrained by the President or by Congress without
Constitutional amendment or resistance from the courts. However, although
the specific mention of freedom of the press was a conscious addition to the
common law recognition on the subject, upon which the British have
depended as a safeguard, it is important to note that the concept was
nonetheless based in English Common Law. (Emery, 1984, p. 91)
There is a strong case that the First Amendment was not intended to
bring about a radical change in press freedom, that it was simply meant to
reaffirm the principle already established in English Common Law, that the
press could not be restrained prior to publication. (Lofton, 1980, p. 10) The
leading British legal authority of the day, William Blackstone, had defined
what was meant by freedom of the press in the classic, Commentaries in the
Law of England written in 1769. He wrote: "The liberty of the press is indeed
essential to the nature of the free state: but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published." (Powe, 1990, p. 6) That the Federalists held this
restrictive view of press freedom became apparent during the passage of the
first national censorship law which paradoxically served as a milestone on
the road to defining the scope of freedom of the press as we know it today.
B. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
1. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798
In the summer of 1798 and war with France seemingly imminent, a
predominantly Federalist Congress passed a series of wartime measures
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Sedition Act declared
"that if any person shall write, print, utter ... any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing ... against the government of the United States, or either
House of Congress ... or the said President ... or to excite against them the
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hatred of the good people of the United States ... or to resist or oppose, or
defeat any law ... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years." (Powe, 1991, p. 57)
The law did not explicitly forbid criticism of the government, only
false and malicious statements—"the truth" could be offered as defense
whereby a jury could determine both the law and the fact. Furthermore the
original bill called for a declaration of war against France with penalties
attached concerning all who might give aid and comfort to m enemy. (Emery,
1984, pp. 101-102).
To justify the legitimacy of a law seemingly precluded by the First
Amendment several explanations were given. Representative Harrison Gray
Otis reasoned that the power was inherent: "Every independent Government
has the right to preserve and defend itself against injuries and outrages which
endanger its existence." (Lofton, 1980, p. 26) Buttressing this position, it was
argued that Congress had already been given an expressed grant in Article 1,
Section 8 "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States or any Department of
Officer thereof."
However, instead of making the textual argument that the Sedition
Act was "necessary and proper" in order to facilitate war powers during an
impending crisis with France, Representative Robert Harper concluded it was
"necessary and proper" because the government could not function "if
sedition for opposing laws and libels against its officers, it proceedings, are to
pass unpunished." (Powe, 1991, p. 57) Freedom of the press, added Otis "is
nothing more than the liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking one's
thoughts, under the condition of being answerable to the injured party . . . [it] is
merely an exemption from all previous restraints." (Lofton, 1980, p. 27)
Ironically, the Sedition Act actually expanded the scope of freedom of
the press. Although "there may be circumstances—as even Abraham Lincoln
[later] noted—where forgetting the Constitution is necessary in order to
preserve it—" this was not one of them. (Powe, 1991, p. 57) The declaration of
war was not included in the bill, and war with France did not materialize.
The Sedition Act essentially became a partisan tool in the hands of the
Federalist Party to curb administration criticism. The public outrage towards
the ensuring prosecutions of seditious libel made it clear that freedom of the
press in America had come to mean much more than its English Common
Law origins. Instead of being confined to the issue of prior restraint, a more
liberal interpretation of the amendment as a bar to prosecutions of seditious
libel became accepted. (Lofton, 1980, p. 10) When the Sedition Act expired on
the last day of the Adams administration in March 1801, President Jefferson,
upon assuming office, pardoned all those convicted under this
"unauthorized act of Congress." (Mott, 1962, p. 152). It was not until World
War I that such a law was again enacted and the boundaries of press freedom
were again redefined.
2. Wartime Measures of Censorship
Upon entry into World War I in 1917, the Wilson administration had
three legislative goals: one that would authorize the president to censor
information that "might be useful to the enemy"; a second that would
prohibit "willfully" making false statements interfering with military success
or causing insubordination in the military or obstructing the draft; and a third
that would render "non-mailable" the publications that ignored the
provisions of the second. (Powe, 1990, p. 67) What eventually emerged were
three significant laws dealing with censorship: the Espionage Act of 1917 and
its 1918 amendment, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, and the
Sedition Act of 1918.
In its final form, the Espionage Act imposed criminal liability on
those who "shall make or convey false reports or false statements with the
intent to interfere with the operations or success of the military or naval
forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies ... or shall
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or
refusal of duty in the military forces of the United States." (Grossman, 1989, p.
22) The censorship provision sought by the administration was not included,
because it was a prior restraint and because it could have been used to
suppress administrative criticism. Most of the litigation involved provisions
toward the second legislative goal and in support of that, the non-mailability
clause remained. Although non-mailability could be considered a form of
censorship, it only effects those materials carried by the postal services,
presidential censorship, on the other hand, could have prevented the
circulation of all information. Historian David Rabban argues that the
legislative history "suggests that the majority wanted to restrict antiwar
speech it considered dangerous while protecting main newspapers and other
non-threatening expression." (Powe, 1990, pp. 67-69) Regardless, as the war
progressed, First Amendment concerns increasingly took a back seat to
national security concerns and the propagation of the war.
The Espionage Act was followed by the Trading with the Enemy Act
of 1917 which authorized censorship of all communications moving in and
out of the United States and required any newspaper or magazine published
in a foreign language to file a sworn translation with the Post Office, and, if
appropriate, withhold military privileges from offending publications. The
Sedition Act of 1918 broadened the Espionage Act by making it a crime to
write or publish "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about
the form of government of the United States or the Constitution, military or
naval forces, flag, or the uniform" or to use language intended to bring these
ideas and institution "into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute." (Emery,
1984, p. 359)
In general, mainstream press reaction to these measures was
surprisingly supportive. The St. Louis Republic remarked,
There never was any such thing in the United States as freedom to
encourage treason. There never was any freedom in this country to aid
the enemies of the country by word of mouth or any other way. There
can be no law which abridges a freedom which never existed.
Congress has power to punish reasonable utterances because its first duty
is to maintain the Government of the United States. (Lofton, 1980, p. 174)
However, after the wartime hysteria and patriotic fervor subsided, the true
test of the appropriateness and constitutionality of these acts was decided in
the courts. Moreover "the First Amendment's expansion to include the
ramified issues of free expression, either not considered at the time [of its
creation] or not existing, came only through a history of such national
experience and through judicial interpretation." (Lofton, 1980, p. 10) World
War I with its widespread restriction of freedom of expression, more so than
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any previous time in U.S. history, signalled the beginning of authoritative
interpretation of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press by
the Supreme Court. (Lofton, 1980, p. 169)
C JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
1. Clear and Present Danger
Out of the prosecution of the Espionage and Sedition Acts came
several landmark cases balancing national security concerns against First
Amendment rights. The Espionage Act was upheld most notably in Schenck
v. U.S. in which Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes advanced what has become
known as the "clear and present danger" test. He said, "The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." (Emery, 1984, p. 365) This strengthened the theory of
balancing competing public and private interests usually presented in First
Amendment cases. The needs of wartime mobilization reinforced the
emphasis on subordinating the individual to the social order. So even as the
Espionage Age "did not incorporate the boldest efforts at censorship, its
underlying premise was that criticism of wartime policies could and should
be limited." (Powe, 1990, p. 70)
The Sedition Act was also upheld in its first Supreme Court test, but
with a decidedly pronounced concern over First Amendment rights.
Although the majority view held to the clear and present danger rule, Judge
Holmes and Judge Louis Brandeis dissented, arguing that the best test of truth
was by "free trade in ideas" and the "power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Furthermore, Holmes added,
"Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time warrants making an exception to the
sweeping command "Congress shall make no laws ... abridging the freedom
of speech."(Emery, 1984, p. 366) However, crisis times happen and the
pathology they give occasion to is unchanging. (Powe, 1990, p. 76)
The more sweeping mandates of the Sedition Act were revoked
when the act was repealed in 1921, but both the Espionage Act and the
Trading with the Enemy Act remained on the statue books and to be recalled
again during World War II. (Emery, 1984, p. 477) Moreover, the Espionage
Acts of 1917 and 1918 serve as the primary source for government restrictions
on the dissemination of information relating to national security today and
the constitutionality of the acts has been upheld in every challenge.
(Grossman, 1989, p. 22) In fact in most First Amendment cases the court has
found exception to matters of national security.
In Near vs. Minnesota (1931) the opinion's most famous passage
implied that national security interests may even provide grounds for prior
restraint: "No one would question but that a government [during actual war]
might prevent obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
sailing dates of troops and transports or the number and location of troops."
(Powe, 1990, p. 145) However, although most would agree, including the
courts, that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to provide
secrets, walking the line between freedom of the press and national security
has nonetheless been tenuous.
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It is important to note that prior restraint was not authorized in the
case of Near; although the exception to national security interests was
opinioned it did not include this particular case. Consequently Near vs.
Minnesota stands as a landmark case for both freedom of the press and
national security interests. Both views were cited in the Pentagon Papers case
(1971) when the government issued a temporary restraining order on
publication by the New York Times, of secret documents pertaining to policy
decisions of the Vietnam War. Although the government argued that the
publication of the papers might prolong the war, the courts ruled against
prior restraint. But instead of ruling the government had no right to issue an
injunction, it cited "the government carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such a restraint"; in effect the
government had not proved a "clear and present danger" to national security.
(Emery 1984, pp. 598-600)
As a rule the press is free to publish most information without fear of
injuncture, and those statutes providing criminal sanctions against
publication of classified information after the fact, are generally limited in
scope, and often require the government to prove the person acted with
intent to injure the U.S. or confer an advantage on a foreign country.
(Grossman, 1991, p. 26) The question of postpublication punishment was
raised, although not acted upon, in the Pentagon Papers case. In fact when it
was demanded that the Times stop its publication, the government
referenced both the sensitive nature of the material and that its possession
violated the Espionage Act. (Powe, 1990, p. 152) This leaves open the question
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about how this information was obtained. What about the right of the free
press to access information?
2. Media Access: The Public's Right to Know
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of media access
numerous times, and in its opinion the First Amendment does not give the
news media special authority to access government information or activities.
Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, "The right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestricted right to gather information." (O'Brien, 1981, p.
122) In Saxbe vs. the Washington Post Co., (1974), the court ruled that, "The
Constitution does not . . . require government accord the press special access to
information not shared by members of the public generally." Although in
Richmond Newspapers vs. Virginia, the court opinioned, "The right of access
to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been,
may be assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech
and press" (Grossman, 1989, pp. 22-24); the key phrase was, "places
traditionally open to the public" (Braestrup, 1985, p. 129). The Department of
Defense could feasibly argue that battlefields are not such places. (Denniston,
1984, p. 13)
The press contends that special access is necessary in order to fulfill
their responsibilities to the public's right to know—although some would
argue that this is a self-appointed responsibility. In Dayton Newspapers, Inc.,
vs. City of Dayton, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas commented:
"The so-called 'right of the public to know' is a rationalization
developed by the fourth estate (the press) to gain rights not shared by
others ... to improve its private ability to acquire information which is
the raw asset of its business ... the Constitution does not appoint the
fourth estate the spokesmen (sic) of the people. The people speak
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through their elective process and through the individuals it elects to
positions created for that purpose. The press has no right that exceeds
that of other citizens. (O'Brien, 1981, p. 10)
A more pervasive view is that the public's right to know is tied to a need to
know by virtue of some functional status. By the same token, the right to
withhold information, as for the right to know, must also be the necessity of
legitimate function. (Grossman, 1989, p. 24) It could be said national security
is the most important legitimate function of any government. Media access
and the public's right to know should be balanced against this legitimate
function. The conduct of military-press relations has been effectively built
on this premise—but not without some friction.
The development of military-press relations has centered on the
debate over access—access to information on the battlefield, as the military
arm of national security policy takes hold. Given that there is no clear legal
basis for access to the battlefield, admission has generally been at the
prerogative of the military. The military, as an arm of government, has
accepted the basic proposition that knowledge is the key to popular
government and that to enlighten the public the press must have the fullest
possible access to the news—including the battlefield. Military press policies
have generally taken into account the public's right to know but only when
balanced against the needs of operational security—a most tangible adjunct to
national security. It is here that the friction lies, again less in substance than
in scope, concerning the degree of access to, and dissemination of, affecting
the conduct of military operations.
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D. A POTENT WEAPON
Having reviewed the legislative actions and judicial interpretations that
have helped define the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press
within the context of national security, the following chapters will explore the
development of military press relations. The past suggests that freedom of
the press can be a "potent weapon in the political arsenal" and both a tangible
and psychological factor to consider in national security planning. (Howell,
1990, p. 149) Furthermore the continuities of military-press policies far
outweigh the discontinuities, as national security concerns, and with it,
operational security, have overwhelmingly found preeminence over
freedom of the press during war. Although the record of the past was not
ignored during the Gulf War, neither was it fully comprehended. It is to this
endeavor that the remainder of this paper is devoted.
Chapter II focuses on those historical events central to the evolution of
the military-press relations from the Revolutionary War era through the
Korean War. This analysis includes accounts of the Mexican War, Civil War,
the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. Such
substantive issues as the changing natures of warfare and the press, the
growth of propaganda, the role of field press censorship and the technological
innovations affecting media coverage complete the chronology. These same
categories of issues are also covered in Chapter III on Vietnam, but with a
more decided focus.
Particular attention is given to the Vietnam War as a watershed in U.S.
military-press relations and as the starting point of analysis of the Persian
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Gulf War. The perceptions and misperceptions of how the Vietnam War was
covered deeply affected military press relations for years after and shaped
military-press policies both before and during the Gulf War. Chapter IV
analyzes the press policies that developed in the Persian Gulf as a result of the
Vietnam experience. DoD guidance reflected a keen awareness of the need for
press controls, and the need for some offensive public relations platform in
the Gulf—both seen as lacking in Vietnam. Such were the lessons of history,
and to further that understanding, these issues will be reexamined along with
other lessons that may have been missed. By better understanding how the
military-press relationship has developed up to and now including the
Persian Gulf War, recommendations for improving this relationship can
more effectively be evaluated and implemented for future military conflict.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY PRESS RELATIONS
A. RISE OF THE POPULAR PRESS
1. The Revolutionary War
It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many of
the publications. We see in almost every paper, proclamations or
accounts transmitted by the enemy of an injurious nature. If some hint
or caution could be given them on the subject, it might be of material
service.
—General George Washington, 1777
(Grossman, 1989, p. 3)
U.S. military concern over war reporting is as old as the nation itself,
and its fledgling newspaper profession. There were approximately 35
newspapers in publication in the colonies on the eve of the Revolution, and
although only 20 of the original survived, six and a half years of war
generated enough news to create another 35, of which 15 remained in
publication by the end of the war. Of these 70 papers, nearly all weeklies, only
15 were of the Tory persuasion. (Mott, 1962, p. 95) The remaining were quite
sympathetic to the patriot cause. In fact, the printers, publishers and editors
were important influences in garnishing public support for the revolution
and in maintaining the fighting spirit during the war. (Emery, 1984, p. 77)
Given the growing tide of patriot sentiment, censorship was not
deemed prudent by Royalist authorities. Lieutenant Governor Colden of
New York remarked, in 1765, "that considering the present temper of the
people this is not a proper time to prosecute the printers and publishers of the
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Seditious Papers." The Revolutionaries seized upon this very temper to
effect their own censorship laws once independence had been declared. In
fact all the colonies passed wartime laws prohibiting the publishing of
materials supporting the King although most censorship was achieved
covertly through the use of threats and mob violence on the part of the Sons
of Liberty and other Patriot organizations. (Linfield, 1990, p. 16) (Mott, 1962,
pp. 103-104)
The importance of the print media to the revolutionary cause was
also recognized by the military leadership. General Washington himself
issued a plea to patriot women to save all available material that could be
converted to printing paper when wartime shortages of printing supplies
emerged. He was also instrumental in the founding of the New Jersey
Gazette, which for a time served as a kind of army newspaper. (Emery, 1984, p.
83) Not surprisingly common attitudes and actions made for relatively
amiable military-press relations. Moreover, the nature of war reporting,
along with the limitations of time and space in communications, rendered
the concept of military censorship moot.
War correspondence as it exists today was unheard of during the War
for Independence, although the most notable war reporting of the conflict
came from the chance eyewitness account of the Battles of Lexington and
Concord by patriot-editor Isaiah Thomas. (Emery, 1984, p. 83) The fact is
newspapers had no organized means of covering the war, but relied almost
completely on the random arrival of private letters and of official and semi-
official messages. Furthermore, editors clipped copy from other
newspapers—both foreign and domestic—that used similar methods of
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reporting. (Mott, 1962, p. 99) The Royalist New York Gazette and Mercury
published this report on February 2, 1778 from a month old Boston paper:
The Hartford Post tells us, That he saw a Gentleman in Springfield, who
informed him that he (the Gentleman) saw a letter from an officer in
Gen. Howe's army to another in Gen. Burgoyne's, giving him to
understand, war was declared on both sides of France and Spain against
the mighty kingdom of Britain.
As concerns France, the report was premature, while regarding Spain, the
event was anticipated by more than a year. (Mott, 1962, p. 100)
The great preponderance of war reports at this time was in any
combination, second-hand, inaccurate and considerably tardy. Military
operations compounded the obstacles which post riders normally
encountered as detours around war-blocked regions caused increased delay.
These less than propitious conditions of war correspondence also plagued the
War of 1812, with coverage of campaigns and incidents almost as haphazard
as that during the Revolutionary War. (Mott, 1962, p. 196) Not until the
Mexican War did newspapers make any attempt at organized war coverage,
thus marking the beginning of modern war correspondence as we know it
today (Mott, 1962, p. 248).
2. The Mexican War
Journalism is literature in a hurry . .
.
—Mathew Arnold
(Emery, 1984, p. 159)
According to historian Frank Luther Mott, "the news coverage of the
Mexican War was far more copious than that of any previous war in any part
of the world." (Mott, 1962, p. 248) Historian F. Taurision Bullard adds that it
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was "the first war to be adequately and comprehensively reported in the daily
press." (Mathews, 1957, p. 53) This trend developed out of a distinctly
American attitude toward journalistic enterprise and the emergence of the
war correspondent as a regular feature of war reporting:
In sharp contrast to the dignified professionalism of the Europeans, the
Americans reported wars as they fought them: they ignored rules and
precedents, introduced a spirit of competition unknown to the European
press, and welcomed rough writers as enthusiastically as rough riders.
There were no legal restrictions on reporting on the Mexican War. More
than that, there was very little to distinguish a reporter from an ordinary
soldier. Writing men fought and a number of fighting men wrote.
(Mathews, 1957, p. 54)
Unlike today, where correspondents are noncombatant, the first
American War correspondents were generally attached to an army group.
This early precedent was unintentionally set during the War of 1812 when
James M. Bradford enlisted in Jackson's army while in defense of New
Orleans and then proceeded to write a series of letters back home to his paper
the Time Piece in St. Franceville, Louisiana. (Mott, 1962, p. 196) During the
Mexican War there were a score of these "special correspondents," the most
notable being George W. Kendall of the New Orleans Picayune. He covered
all the major battles from Monterrey to Chapultepec, gave accurate accounts
of the operations and tactics involved and was later attached to General
Worth's staff. Likewise the Delta's leading correspondent, James L. Freaner,
occasionally acted as an official dispatch carrier. Freaner capped his successful
career as a war correspondent by peronally delivering the peace treaty from
Mexico to Washington in a record 17 days. (Emery, 1984, p. 166) (Mott, 1962,
pp. 249-250)
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In addition to these writer-soldiers, there were soldier-writers who
acted as "occasional correspondents." These men, mainly former printers and
reporters, had joined the army for the sole purpose of fighting, but later found
time to write to their former editors back home on an informal basis (Emery,
1984, p. 167). These soldier-printers were also responsible for establishing
another new development—the camp newspaper—the most important of
which, the American Flag of Scott's army, was used by many papers as a chief
source of war news. (Mott, 1962, p. 250) In general, the reports, whether
written by soldier writers or writer-soldiers supported U.S. involvement in
the war and the imperial idea of Manifest Destiny. They also generated
favorable publicity and promoted the popular war-hero images of military
leaders such as Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. (Emery, 1984, p. 167) Still,
as supportive as the press was toward the military, it was nonetheless a
synergistic relationship; after all, war was big news.
When War with Mexico broke out in May 1846, the telegraph
extended no further than Richmond and the Southern railway system was
quite fragmentary (Mott, 1962, p. 244), yet by combining these abilities with the
pony express, the press was able to establish a 2000-mile communication link
that repeatedly beat the military couriers and other official sources with news
from the front. This express system was so effective that President Polk was
first informed of the American victory in Vera Cruz via telegraph by the
publisher of the Baltimore Sun. One casual observer remarked, "If our troops
do make as vigorous a charge upon the enemy as newsboys do upon the
public with their extras the victory will be ours without a doubt." (Emery,
1984, pp. 165-166)
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Although newspaper circulation surged during the Mexican War,
covering it was costly. Quite according to the tradition of news-gathering at
the time, the News Orleans papers, which were closest to the war zone, led
the coverage of the conflict; but getting this news back to the East Coast via the
express system was just as expensive an enterprise. Several newspapers
therefore began to pool their efforts. Not long after the war, this cooperation
in news-gathering led to the genesis of the Associated Press, which expanded
correspondence at all important points through cooperative telegraphic news
reporting. (Mott, 1962, pp. 251-252) In fact, much of the groundwork for
modern war correspondence emerged at this time. But while developments
like the use of the telegraph to speed delivery, and of war correspondents to
provide comprehensive coverage, were in their infancy and of little concern
to the waging of this popular, successful war, the same could not be said of the
coverage of the next American conflict, where not only North and South, but
pen and sword were pitted against each other as the nation struggled for
survival.
3. The Civil War
Now to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes
along, filling up our transports, swelling our trains, reporting our
progress, guessing at places picking up dropped expressions, inciting
jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite mischief.
—General William T. Sherman
(Knightley, 1989, p. 28)
No war had ever been so fully and freely reported before the Civil
War. The North by itself had some 500 correspondents in the field
(Knightley, 1989, p. 20) Furthermore, for the first time the telegraph was
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available for large-scale use, with nearly 50,000 miles of telegraph line in just
the Eastern states alone, thus allowing for not only more extensive but more
immediate press coverage of the war. It was now possible for the American
public to have a first-hand report of what happened yesterday, rather than an
outdated opinion of what occurred weeks prior. (Knightley, 1989, pp. 20-21)
More important, the possibilities for disseminating information of potential
use to the enemy increased tremendously as a result of these developments
—
much to the chagrin of the military and civilian leadership alike.
In July 1861, William Howard Russell, Special American
correspondent to The Times of London, observed:
A swarm of newspaper correspondents has settled down upon
Washington, and great are the florifications of the high-toned
paymasters, gallant doctors, and subalterns accomplished in the art of
war, who furnish minute items to my American brethren and provide
the yeast which overflows in many columns; but the government
experience the inconvenience of the smallest movements being
chronicled for use of the enemy, who by putting one thing and another
together, are no doubt enabled to collect much valuable information.
(Weisberger, 1953, p. 74)
Undoubtedly the War Department felt a little more than
"inconvenienced." It was well known that President Davis and his
Confederate generals took great pains to secure northern papers for news of
troop and vessel movements. (Mott, 1962, p. 337). General Robert E. Lee was
particularly studious in reviewing northern papers for intelligence
information—especially on the reports by one correspondent from the
Philadelphia Inquirer who, Lee said, "knew what he reported and reported
what he knew." (Mathews, 1957, p. 86) Is it any wonder that when Florus
Plympton of the Cincinnati Commercial arrived at General William T.
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Sherman's command in September 1861 to learn the "truth," Sherman flew
into a rage. "We don't want the truth told about things here," Sherman
exploded, "... We don't want the enemy any better informed than he is."
(Andrews, 1991, p. 78)
Although there had been some isolated attempts at military
censorship during the Mexican War, there is no record in the War
Department files of military censorship prior to the Civil War. (Emery, 1984,
p. 195) However, with each passing month of modern war, it became clearer
that "the government which governed least was likely to lose most," and so
as the war dragged on, "necessity" dictated the restriction of many civil
liberties, not the least of which was freedom of the press. (Weisberger, 1953, p.
77) This was not an easy task either. Not only was there no prior system of
censorship from which to draw on, the problem was exacerbated by an
American press that had become so prosperous, aggressive and independent,
it balked at any form of restriction. (Emery, 1984, p. 195) Consequently, the
rules had to be written and learned as the fighting went on, and the learning
process was more often than not punctuated by much bad faith and criticism.
(Weisberger, 1953, pp. 78-79)
The development of Civil War military censorship began by
restricting the mailing privileges of newspapers and other correspondence to
enemy areas. (Emery, 1984, p. 195) But these restrictions did not make up for
lax security. Commander of the Union Forces, General Winfield Scott
complained in fact that he would prefer a hundred spies in camp, to one
reporter. (Weisberger, 1953, p. 79) Although the better correspondents used
much skill in concealing information of value to the enemy, and some
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editors imposed their own censorship, it was deemed prudent that some sort
of understanding be made between the press and the military early on in the
conflict.
On August 2, 1861, General B. McClellan called a historic press
conference of Washington area correspondents laying out a plan of voluntary
self-censorship. The correspondents agreed not to transmit information of
military value to the enemy, and in exchange the general guaranteed the
army's assistance in providing the reporters facilities for transmitting their
stories if "suitable for publication." This so called "gentlemen's agreement"
met with little success. The Baltimore newspapers which were not included
in the conference, continued to enlighten its readership with troop
movements in the capital area, while many of the correspondents included in
the conference were quite generous in their estimate of what was "suitable for
publication." (Weisberger, 1953, p. 81)
Or course the generals were doubly obstreperous and alternately
banned many correspondents from their respective armies. By the end of
August 1861, there was a marked sharpening of official tone and the War
Department issued a general order calling attention to the 57th Article of War
which provided for the court martial and possible death sentence of those
giving military information either "directly or indirectly" to the enemy.
However, like many other restrictions, this order was largely disreguarded.
As it stood, regulations were imposed here and there by civil and military
authorities alike, but with no consistent enforcement of any fixed body of
rules controlling the press. (Mott, 1962, p. 337)
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The impotence of these early censorship measures stemmed in part
from confusion over the enforcing agency. At different times during the war
censorship was administered by the Treasury, State and War Departments.
(Knightley, 1989, p. 27) While under the State Department telegraphic
dispatches from Washington relating to both military and civil operations of
the government were prohibited. (Emery, 1984, p. 146) Questions of
inadequate administration and inconsistent application prompted an
investigation by the House Judiciary Committee which ultimately concluded
that wholesome discussion and criticism had been restrained under the State
Department system (Mott, 1962, p. 338) By February 1862 censorship was
placed under the War Department and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
where it stayed for the remainder of the war.
Secretary of War Stanton clarified the triple set of restrictions by
which correspondents had been bound voluntarily, by the State Department,
or by the hands of the generals. Correspondents were to submit copy to
provost marshalls for approval before transmission, understanding that
deletions would apply only to military matters. (Emery, 1984, p. 196)
Furthermore, the War Department assumed supervision of all telegraphic
lines in the country and announced that newspapers would be banned from
publishing so much as inferences as to "the number, position, or strength of
the military force of the United States." (Weisberger, 1953, p. 91)
Soon the War Department, in an attempt to affix responsibility,
requested newspapers to adopt by-lines to their war stories. (Mott, 1962, p. 338)
Related to this issue of press responsibility came the new practice of
accreditation. Instead of allowing "spies" to wander about the military camps,
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correspondents now had to be recognized journalists, and they had to be
acceptable to commanders in the field. This procedure established a precedent
which has been followed ever since by military correspondents. (Emery, 1984,
p. 196)
Moreover, the War Department insured compliance to those and
other measures by suspending newspapers, arresting editors and banning
correspondents that broke the new censorship rules. Additionally, Stanton
issued his own dispatches through the Associated Press to combat the rumors
and alarmist reports made by some war correspondents. These daily war
bulletins began the practice developed in later wars to set forth briefly the war
situation and administration policy. (Knightley, 1989, p. 27)
So while the struggle to set up rules concerning press coverage during
the Civil War evoked bitter criticism on the part of both the military and the
press, by the war's end, certain principles had been established regardless.
First, although "Freedom of the Press" was recognized as a fixed national
tradition in America, an aggressive newspaper industry would not reign
supreme on the battlefield. Second, advances in communication increased
potential security risks to the extent that some controls over the
dissemination of information would be necessary to the propagation of war.
And third, because access to the battlefield was in essence a function of the
military, it effectively became the responsibility of the military to create
guidelines for the press that would be both uniform and consistent in
application and enforcement. Moreover, the valuable lessons that emerged
from this war over the control and use of communication agencies set the
tone for wartime censorship in the next century. (Emery, 1984, p. 195)
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4. The Spanish-American War
Before the type size reached its maximum, "War Sure" could be put in
one line across a page, and it was put in one line and howled through
the streets by patriotic newsboys many and many a time. As war was
sure it did no harm.
—Arthur Brisbane, Journal editor
(Emery, 1984, p. 291)
Because of the rise of the popular press, the increased use of the
telegraph, and lack of organized rules of censorship, the period between the
Civil War and World War I is considered a "Golden Age" for war
correspondents. According to Phillip Knightley "the military establishment
was slow to realize the power of this newly awakened section of public
opinion and allowed correspondents to write virtually what they liked."
(Knightley, 1989, p. 42) More likely, however, the uninhibited press coverage
of the Spanish-American War of 1898 occurred out of proximity and degree
than from any lack of acknowledgement over the power of the press. Indeed,
if anything, this war fully illustrated that power.
The yellow journalism indigenous to turn of the century reporting is
said not only to have spawned the Spanish-American War but also to have
fought it. The spirit of "Manifest Destiny" was alive and well in U.S. foreign
policy at this time and had brought the United States and Spain on the verge
of war over the neighboring Spanish colony of Cuba. Many newspapers
reflected the imperialist proclivities and democratic idealism that drove this
U.S. expansion of interests and further, promoted it. (Emery, 1984, pp. 288-
289) A few weeks after the hyped-up coverage of the sinking of the Maine,
the New York Tribune sarcastically criticized the actions of its jingoistic
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competitors: "If, as now seems probable, its ravages can be confined to
Printing House Square and Spain is "licked" right here with blood-red extras
without resorting to shot and shell, it will be the greatest triumph ever
achieved by large type and a liberty-loving press." (Mott, 1962, p. 533)
Moreover "the newspapers fought the war as determinedly as they
had fostered it" as some 500 reporters, artists, and photographers flocked to
Florida and the Cuban and Puerto Rican fronts to both make and record the
news—for few if any sought to maintain a non-combatant status. (Emery,
1984, p. 292) (Mott, 1962, p. 536) The Associated Press went so far as to charter
a flotilla of boats which cruised at will during naval engagements, ignoring
fire from both sides as they scurried back and forth to the nearest cable lines.
(Knightley, 1989 p. 56) The A.P. also prevailed upon President McKinley to
permit their reporters on Navy flagships. William Randolph Hearst, owner
of the sensationalist New York Journal made similar overtures, and although
McKinley refused his offer to organize and equip a regiment, the President
did accept the use of the Hearst yacht, the Buccaneer, during the war. Hearst
went on to commandeer a small fleet of purchased and hired steamers and
tugs and led a force of some twenty writers, artists and photographers to the
scene of the war and to the capture of twenty-six stranded Spanish sailors.
(Mott, 1962, p. 335-336)
Correspondents covered every battle and skirmish in Cuba (Emery,
1984, p. 282) and despite the journalistic enterprize and competitive endeavor
by which the coverage of this war is renown, military leaders were on the
whole patient and cooperative. For the most part newspapers freely reported
the movements of the Army and Navy, although there were occasional
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attempts by military and naval officers to control the press—such as General
Shafter's banishment of all Hearst reporters from the capture of Santiago.
Also, a few months into the war, a former New York Tribune reporter, Grant
Squires, was appointed military censor at New York, but this too proved only
moderately effective, and the leniency of military censorship remained
extraordinary. (Mott, 1962, pp. 536-537) According to Mott:
The war with Spain was, as wars go, almost ideal for newspaper
treatment. It was near at hand. American commanders allowed
unusual freedom to correspondents. It was a small war, and thus not too
difficult to cover. American arms on land and sea met with a series of
successes that could be reported brilliantly [and] it was a short war, so that
the public interest could be fully maintained until its end. (Mott, 1962, p.
533)
The press presented a thrilling adventure story that boosted
newspaper circulation and garnished public support. Furthermore the
Golden Age style of reporting—"where guns flash, cannons thunder, the
struggle rages, the general is brave, the soldiers are gallant, and their bayonets
make short work of the enemy"—only added to this illusion. (Knightley,
1989, p. 62) The public demand for these stories was great, provided they
remained narratives of adventure, without too much political comment, or
moralizing, or even blood, to interrupt the narrative. (Knightley, 189, p. 42)
However, with the coming of War War I "the cynically irresponsible Civil
War journalism and the comic-opera journalism that fanned the flames of
the war with Spain were left behind." (Brucker, 1949, p. 175)
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B. CENSORSHIP COMES OF AGE
1. World War I
Once lead this people into war and they'll forget there ever was such a
thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless and the
spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national
life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in
the street.
—President Woodrow Wilson, April 1, 1917
(Knightly, 1989, p. 113)
The first casualty when war comes is truth.
—Senator Hiram Johnson, 1917
(Knightley, 1989, p. xi)
In 1914, when war erupted in Europe after the assassination of
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the rapid succession of events which made
Europe one great battlefield shocked the American people. Both the Allied
and the Central Powers recognized the importance of enlisting the aid of the
United States and a "press agents war" emerged, again pitting Germany and
Great Britain against each other as they fought over American neutrality.
(Mott, 1962, p. 615) Revisionist literature based on partial evidence presents a
convincing case whereby "British propagandists, American munitions
makers and cynical politicians led gullible Americans to an unnecessary
slaughter." However, this ignores important factors such as the impact of
official and public opinion on German caused events like the sinking of the
Lusitania; the effects of Allied censorship and the control of overseas
communications in shaping news from Europe (as distinct from direct
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propaganda efforts); strong Anglo-Saxon ties both politically and culturally;
and the belief that German militarism was not in the American national
interests. (Emery, 1984, p. 355) The U.S. government sought to build on all
pro-Allied sentiments, regardless of their origins, in order to restore world
order.
Control of the press was a factor of concern at the highest levels of
government from the outset of U.S. involvement in World War I. On April
14, 1917, little more than a week after the U.S. declaration of war against
Germany, President Wilson created the Committee on Public Information
(CPI) which served the dual purpose of coordinating government propaganda
efforts and acting as governmental liaison with the newspapers. (Emery, 1984,
p. 356) The Secretaries of State, War and Navy Departments had hoped that
these functions would be addressed under the War Department's Bureau of
information—a public relations service under the young Major Douglas
MacArthur, but President Wilson disagreed. He appointed a civilian
journalist named George Creel as head of the CPI and assigned MacArthur as
his aide. (Howell, 1990, p. 135) Although the propaganda and censorship
efforts were taken from the direct control of the military, few could have
asked for a better P.R. agent. So strong was Creels' imprint, the CPI became
known as the Creel Committee. According to Creel "it was a plain publicity
proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure
in advertising." (Emery, 1984, p. 356.)
The Creel Committee sponsored some 75,000 speakers who gave
some 750,000 speeches in 5000 cities and towns throughout the United States
in order to arouse the "righteous wrath" of the American public against the
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German Huns. (Knightley, 1989, p. 123) But despite these blatant propaganda
efforts, the news releases issued from the CPI, although colored with patriot
fervor, were on the whole accurate and full of news value, and most
newspapers published them. (Mott, 1962, p. 626) One historian,who later
studied the accuracy of CPI news releases, noted, "One of the most remarkable
things about the charges against the CPI is that, of the more than 6,000 news
stories it issued, so few were called into question at all. It may be doubted that
the CPI's record for honesty will never be equalled in the official war news of
a major power." (Emery, 1984, p. 358)
Although the CPI News Division founded its own release sheet, the
Official Bulletin, on May 10, 1917 with a circulation of 118,000, the thrust of
Creel's work lay in maintaining a strong relationship with the newspapers.
Theory was, in effect, "if newspapers were given enough worthwhile material
to fill their columns, there would be little need to issue detailed and stringent
orders restricting the publication of other information." (Daniels, 1985, p. 38)
The slack was to be taken up by the voluntary censorship code whereby the
newspaper editors agreed to suppress news which might give aid to the
enemy. In return Creel insisted that only information concerning troop
movements, ship sailings, and other events of a strictly military nature
would be withheld. (Emery, 1984, pp. 356-357)
Most newspapers complied with the "voluntary" censorship
provisions set by the Creel Committee, however, it is important to remember,
as covered in the previous chapter, that several laws had been enacted
empowering the government to ensure that no violations of security would
go unpunished. Still, as the Nation observed in 1918, "During the past two
32
years, we have seen what is practically an official control of the press, not
merely by Messrs. Burleson and Gregory [the Post Office Department and the
Department of Justice] but by the logic of events and the patriotic desire of the
press to support the government." (Mott, 1962, p. 625)
At the front, European control of the press was equally pervasive,
although American correspondents in France were freer to observe the
actions of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) than were those of other
armies. General Pershing allowed correspondents to go to the front lines
unescorted. (Emery, 1984, p. 361). This was not typical of the British, French
and German armies, although prior to U.S. entry into the war, the Germans
allowed several "neutral" U.S. correspondents the opportunity to preview the
German war machine in an attempt to gain some propagandic value. The
British realized that same value, and had been particularly obsequious in
their treatment of American correspondents during this time. Nonetheless,
it was a risky proposition as a neutral correspondent being accredited to either
army, for if a British accredited correspondent later reported from the German
side and was subsequently captured by the British, he would be executed as a
spy. The Germans eventually adopted the same procedure. (Knightley, 1989,
pp. 114-122) Accreditation later played an important role in U.S. field press
control, too, and was the first wicket through which an American reporter
passed before joining the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).
The rules for accreditation were quite stringent. The correspondent
had to personally appear before the Secretary of War and swear he would
"convey the truth to the United States," without disclosing information that
might aid the enemy. An autobiographical sketch had to be submitted along
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with a detailed account of his proposed itinerary. He or his paper had to post
$1,000 to the Army to cover equipment and maintenance, as well as a $10,000
bond which could be forfeited for any infraction of the rules. (Knightley, 1989,
p. 124)
While there were some 500 American correspondents covering the
war for various newspapers, magazines, press associations and syndicates by
1915, a number that increased with the U.S. entry into the war, only about
forty actually covered the actions of the AEF. Their stories all went through
the press section of Military Intelligence Service headed by Major Frederick
Palmer, formerly of the Associated Press. Military engagements, casualties,
and troop identification could only be reported if first released in official
communique. (Emery, 1984, p. 361). Palmer, who increasingly affiliated
himself with the military, released only the sparsest of information, generally
laudatory in nature. "Censorship," complained one reporter during the war,
"is developing more in the news interests of the military than in the
American reader." (Knightley, 1989, pp. 128-130) However, despite the
censorship imposed on the correspondents by both the American and
European military authorities, the American pubic was better informed as to
the progress of the war than any other nation, and like it or not, the press
controls of World War I set the standard for the press coverage of the next
major U.S. conflict, World War EL (Mott, 1962, p. 623)
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2. World War II
All Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the
experience of this and all other nations has demonstrated that some
degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war.
- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941
(Mott, 1962, p. 761)
I wouldn't tell them anything until the war is over and then I'd tell
them who won.
—Military censor
(Knightley, 1989, p. 269)
President Roosevelt, acting under the First War Powers Act, created
the Office of Censorship on December 19, 1941. Byron Price, then executive
news editor of the Associated Press, was named director and instructed to
censor all international communications "at his discretion" (Mott, 1962, p.
761). This task included communications entering or leaving the United
States by mail, cable, or radio. Furthermore, by a separate directive, the agency
was charged with setting up a system of voluntary press censorship.
According to Price, there were three cardinal principles guiding this "system
of self-discipline under the leadership of government": "that censorship was
an instrument of war, that censorship must be so administered as to be
effective, that this was to be an American censorship, in harmony 'with the
best interests of our free institutions.'" (Mott, 1962, p. 762)
From this philosophy, a rather elaborate Code of Wartime Practices
for the American Press was developed outlining what news was considered
improper for publication—namely, any news "which might directly or
indirectly bring aid or comfort to the enemy, or which might interfere with
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the national effort, or disparage the foreign relations of, the United States or
any Anti-Axis nations." (Linfield, 1990, p. 71). Under this code, censorship
was not only limited to information pertaining to troop movements and ship
sailings, but also included information relating to war production, morale,
and weather. A similar code was devised for the radio. According to
historian Frank Luther Mott:
The voluntary censorship was an extraordinary performance,
outstanding in the entire history of our democratic processes. It kept war
production efforts secret until they had reached safe levels, kept
Germany uninformed of the near-success of her submarine blockade of
1942, suppressed all kinds of preparations for the invasion landings in
North Africa and Normandy, kept silence about Presidential tours even
when such precautions seemed a little ridiculous, preserved as top
secrets the early development of radar and the preparation of the atomic
bomb. (Mott, 1962, p. 763)
Although safeguarding the war effort was the prime objective behind
the creation and subsequent compliance with the codes issued from the Office
of Censorship, this as only half the equation. Mobilizing the war effort was
the other essential ingredient to Roosevelt's wartime strategy. Unlike the
Creel Commission of World War I, a separate agency was established for this
purpose. The Office of War Information (OWI) was administered by Elmer
Davis, a CBS news analyst and former New York Times editor. "It was the job
of the OWI," said Davis,
not only to tell the American people how the war is going, but where it
is going and where it came from—its nature and origins, how our
government is conducting it, and what (besides national survival) our
government hopes to get out of victory. (Emery, 1984, p. 478)
Elmer Davis unabashedly defended the OWI as the propaganda arm
of the government, describing propaganda as "an instrument"—but an
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instrument in the employment of truth. (Mott, 1962, p. 766) The OWI worked
very closely with the War Advertising Council and the nation's publishers to
facilitate recruitment and other war-related advertising. Furthermore, the
OWI cooperated with the military in the development of psychological-
warfare techniques; in fact, the "Voice of America" originated from OWI
overseas radio broadcasts. (Emery, 1984, p. 479) From the perspective of
Director Davis, "at home and abroad we are telling the same story—telling
the truth." (Mott, 1962, p. 767)
Although the chief task of the OWI was not propagandistic, it did
influence the perception of the war from the government to the press. Its
main function was to "keep the news flowing," and in fact, the OWI did
much to prevent bottlenecks and to discourage unwarranted censorship at the
source. (Mott, 1962, p. 767) The worst offenders were the Navy and War
[Army] Departments. Although both were required to consult with Davis
over the withholding of specific military information, the services retained
the final authority in these matters; consequently, the OWI often received
undue criticism as an information agency. (Emery, 1984, p. 778)
While the OWI News Bureau handled most of the news releases
relating significantly to the war effort or which dealt with more than one
government agency, nearly 40% of government publicity stories emanated
from the governmental departments and agencies themselves without
reference to the OWI. (Emery, 1984, p. 478) Here, the free flow of information
depended upon the willingness of official sources to talk. The Department of
the Navy, headed by newsman Frank Knox, was criticized more frequently
than any other top news source because of late news releases concerning
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certain such naval losses as those at Pearl Harbor (1941) and the Battle of Savo
Island (1942). Navy officials believed that the enemy lacked the intelligence
capabilities to discern the amount of damage inflicted during these
engagements. The Navy claimed that official announcements would have
had the effect of providing "aid and comfort" to the enemy by confirming
enemy reconnaissance. (Mott, 1962, pp. 763-764) Furthermore, because the
Navy did not want Japan to know they had broken the Japanese
communication codes, even news of enemy losses was subject to intense
censorship. (Knightley, 1989, p. 284) Both the Army and Navy effectively
controlled the dissemination of such information by applying "censorship at
the source." Correspondents were not allowed in theater without being
accredited, and one of the conditions for accreditation was to agree to submit
all copy to military censorship. (Knightley, 1989, p. 275)
Field press censorship varied greatly in reasonableness and efficiency
depending on the theater or the command. Moreover, host nation policies
and combined operations often resulted in double censorship. Censors were
judged not on what they got into the newspapers but on what they managed
to keep out. The criterion was: "Is it a good thing for the Army (or the Navy)
to have this information made public?" (Knightly, 1989, p. 275)
Correspondent Fletcher Pratt remarked, "The official censors pretty well
succeeded in putting over the legend that the war was won without a single
mistake by a command consisting exclusively of geniuses." (Knightley, 1989,
p. 276) Of course by 1965, the American people would no longer believe such
assertions.
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Not all correspondents were as harsh in their assessment. In
retrospect, correspondent Drew Middleton believed that censorship enabled
correspondents to be better informed about the war. He wrote: "As long as all
copy was submitted to censors before transmission, people in the field, from
the generals on down felt free to discuss top secret material with reporters."
(Knightley, 1989, p. 316) Little more than ten days before the invasion of
Sicily, General Eisenhower confided to some 30 American reporters his plans
for the assault, including the names of the specific divisions to hit the
beaches. (Andrews, 1991, p. 81)
There were many such examples of military candor, although it
would be difficult to assess whether or not this trend was attributable to
censorship alone or on the overall strength of military-press relations at the
time. On the whole, war correspondents went along with the official scheme
for reporting the war because they believed it was in the national interests to
do so. Writer and correspondent John Steinbeck later reflected:
We were all part of the war effort. We went along with it, and not only
that, we abetted it. Gradually, it became part of us so that the truth about
anything was automatically secret and that to trifle with it was to trifle
with the war effort .... Yes we wrote only a part of the war but at that
time we believed, we fervently believed, that it was the best thing to do.
(Knightley, 1989, p. 276)
The military also considered war correspondents as part of the war
effort. "Public opinion wins war," exclaimed General Eisenhower in a
Clausewitzian insight to a group of newsmen in 1944. "I have always
considered as quasi staff officers, correspondents accredited to my
headquarters." (Knightley, 1989, p. 315) No doubt this sentiment would strike
many today as odd, but at the time it was a somewhat apt appraisal of the
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perceived role of correspondents during war. To facilitate this part of the war
effort of the U.S. War Department accredited 1186 American correspondents
and news officials representing all media, and the Navy accredited 460 more,
with approximately 500 reporting from the war fronts or foreign news centers
at any one time. (Mott, 1962, p. 742) Moreover, for the first time in military-
press relations, the military began to acknowledge radio and press coverage as
an operational requirement. According to Kenneth Knightley,
beginning with the invasion of North Africa, the Allied system for
controlling war correspondents grew steadily through the Italian
campaigns, and by D-Day and the Normandy battles it was as much part
of military planning as, say, logistics was." (Knightley, 1989, p. 315)
The magnitude of on-scene coverage produced several new
developments affecting war correspondence, most notably the establishment
of media pools. The pooling of pictures was common in all combat areas,
while the pooling of news reports was generally limited to large-scale
operations where the number of correspondents had to be limited for reasons
of security and safety. Pools were implemented for the Dieppe commando
raid, the beginning of the North African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and
the first few days of the Normandy invasion as well as numerous Pacific
engagements. (Mott, 1962, p. 744) (Knightley, 1989, p. 295)
The radio was first pooled in the Normandy invasions, and with its
"dramatic effect," "sense of immediacy," and "involvement of the listener"
took the lead in D-Day reporting. (Knightley, 1989, p. 323) The development
of mobile units and the employment of international pickups greatly
increased radio coverage throughout the war. Direct reports came from
battlefields, from bombers engaged in air raids, and from vessels at sea.
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(Emery, 1984, p. 481) Through the cooperation of the Army's Signal Corps,
the wire recorder allowed for close-up stories of actual conflict, and when Italy
surrendered in September 1943, General Eisenhower himself broadcast the
news to the world. (Mott, 1962, p. 745) The military was well aware of the
importance of projecting a good public image, knew what was needed, and
was prepared to devote considerable resources in obtaining it.
The public relations systems of the services grew tremendously
during this time and were much more fully organized than in any previous
war. Public relations officers not only provided liaison with top officers, but
facilitated the living, transportation, and communication arrangements for
the correspondents attached to their area. Moreover, extensive public
relations units developed—like the Combat Correspondents of the Marine
Corps which utilized the technique of training fighter-writers to provide
eyewitness accounts of dangerous amphibious assaults. (Mott, 1962, p. 793)
Commands encouraged the publication of soldier papers ranging from camp
papers to the large circulation Stars and Stripes, a reborn weekly of WWI, AEF
fame. (Emery, 1984, p. 482) The strong emphasis on public relations during
the war eventually led to the elevation of public information programs to a
separate staff status. (Howell, 1990, p. 136) The success of the public relations
effort may be measured by the fact that, by most accounts, "the years between
1941 and 1945 represented the high-water mark of cooperation between the
military and the media." (Andrews, 1991, p. 81) Within half a decade this
course began to change.
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3. The Korean War
All I remember of the war was an incredible number of dead human
beings and a vast amount of misery. All for what? The answer was
certainly not going to be found by running around with a green flash on
my shoulder filing urgent press collect.
—War Correspondent George Johnston
(Knightley, 1989, p. 338)
If World War II represents the high tide of military press relations,
the Korean War marks its ebb, and in many ways anticipated the difficulties
encountered in the Vietnam War. World War II was fought in the "heat of
passion"—in Europe, against Hitler, one of the greatest villains of the 20th
century, and in the Pacific—against an enemy that attacked United States soil.
There was one clear goal—victory. The Korean War was a United Nations
effort, "committed to a policy of prolonged war with no intent of winning a
victory." (Summers, 1982, pp. 37-38) Like the Vietnam War, the Korean War
was unpopular, and undeclared war, and plagued by issues that had military
and political underpinnings. According to historian Hubert Brucker, the
military wanted to "overprotect" information for national security purposes
and the press wanted to publish it for its political implications. This trend
resulted in a growing tension between the government and the press in
which "... much was published that were the better left quiet, and much (was)
suppressed that were better published." (Brucker, 1949, p. 171)
At first General Douglas MacArthur, as the United Nations
commander in Korea dismissed the concept of field press censorship and
relied on self-censorship. MacArthur explained his position in a letter to the
Chicago Sun Times on July 15, 1950: "In the Korean operations it has been
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my purpose to leave (censorship) responsibility where it rightfully belongs
—
in the hands of the correspondents, editors and publishers concerned.
(Daniels, 1985, p. 57). However the guidelines for voluntary censorship were
vague, and proved unsatisfactory to both the military and the press.
There were many security breaches during this period of self-
censorship and a corresponding lack of organized press coverage on the part
of military planners as a whole. The amphibious assault at Inchon in 1950
provides an apt example:
There was little secrecy in allied circles about plans for the landing—it
was known in the Tokyo Press Club as "Operation Common
Knowledge"—but the army declined to consult the correspondents about
the requirements for covering it. As a result, the first assault waves
included barges loaded with magazine writers and columnists, while
many daily newspaper correspondents did not get ashore until two or
three days later. (Knightley, 1989, p. 370)
Even the traditional-minded "team member" reporters found
themselves on their own in the thick of battle. (Emery, 1984, p. 494) It is not
surprising that veteran correspondents considered the Korean War the most
dangerous war covered—with six American news and cameramen killed in
the month of July, 1950 alone—more than any killed in a single month of any
other war. (Mott, 1962, p. 851) Moreover, the early reporting, even by those
with patriotic motives, was critical by customary military standards.
Correspondent Marguerite Higgins wrote:
So long as our government requires the backing of an aroused and
informed public opinion ... it is necessary to tell the hard bruising
truth .... It is best to tell graphically the moments of desperation and
horror endured by an unprepared army, so that the American public will
demand that it does not happen again. (Knightley, 1989, p. 337)
43
During this time, two correspondents, Lambert of the AP and
Kalischer of the UP temporarily lost their accreditation for, in the words of
one public information officer, failing to observe "discretion and cooperation
in the dispatch of their file" and disclosing information that would have "a
bad moral and psychological effect" on the troops. (Knightley, 1989, p. 337) By
July 1950, the voluntary code of censorship, which had been initially aimed at
preserving military secrecy, was expanded to include "criticism of Command
decisions or of the conduct of Allied soldiers on the battlefield. (Mott, 1962, p.
853)
The successful September 1950 landing at Inchon, and subsequent
victories by MacArthur until Thanksgiving 1950 brought about some easing
of military-press relations, but with the entry into the war by the Chinese
Communists in November 1950 and the second fall of Seoul, outspoken
criticism of the "high brass" by front line correspondents renewed the tension
between the military and the press. After it had reached crisis proportions,
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall met with twelve top media
representatives in the Pentagon on December 18, 1950 and adopted a
resolution which concluded that "the security of information from the
combat area is the responsibility of the military." (Mott, 1962, p. 854) Taking
this step as press approval, on December 21, 1950, General MacArthur ended
voluntary censorship and imposed full military censorship.
This move was not unfounded, of the more than 230 American and
foreign correspondents in theater at the time, an estimated 90% favored
censorship as the only means to insure military security. (Braestrup, 1985, pp.
50-54) Rather than continue with a voluntary censorship, described by one
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correspondent as "you-write-what-you-like-and-we'11-shoot-you-if-we-don't-
like-it," the correspondents found themselves in the unusual position of
requesting "full, official, compulsory" censorship. (Knightley, 1989, p. 337)
However, stringent regulations may have gone further than most reporters
would have desired.
Censorship initially consisted of "clearance before transmission" of
all press reports, radio broadcasts, magazine articles and photographs
"pertaining to military operations," but the formal code which emanated
from Tokyo a few weeks later, expanded on this statement quite a bit. The
new censorship provisions barred "any discussion of allied air power" or "the
effect of enemy fire, unless authorized," and included unprecedented
restrictions concerning criticism of allied operations or "derogatory
comments" about United Nations troops and commanders. (Knightley, 1989,
p. 346) Additionally, it was forbidden to write "the result of enemy action
which, if published, would tend ... to cause despondency in our own forces or
people." (Mott, 1962, p. 854) Furthermore, the penalties for violation of the
censorship code could be quite severe, beginning with suspension of
privileges and extending, in extreme cases, to deportation or to court-martial.
(Knightley, 1989, p. 345)
Censorship was handled both in Tokyo at the Far East Command
(FEC) and at Eighth Army Headquarters in Korea. Although policy was
uniform, its application varied. Some correspondents evaded censorship
rules through the use of long-distance telephone calls to expand on cleared
text. These inconsistencies led to several shifts in policy and the censorship
responsibilities were eventually redistributed to insure better accountability
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and efficiency (Braestrup, 1985, pp. 54-56) By June 1951, censorship took place
at only one point—Korean headquarters. (Mott, 1962, p. 854) Furthermore,
the Defense Department revised the censorship system in December 1952,
transferring censorship duties from intelligence to public-relations officers
and bringing the Army, Navy and Air Force under a uniform plan.
Censorship was again limited to matters of concerning military security
—
although the practical definition of "security" remained to be resolved.
(Emery, 1984, p. 496)
Interestingly enough, once full military censorship had been imposed
by the U.N. commander, military media relations improved and there were
few complaints over the strictness of the censorship provisions—in fact as
previously noted, some correspondents viewed it as more an aid than a
hindrance. (Braestrup, 1985, p. 60) According to Knightley, "... there is
evidence that even without the new censorship a backlash had begun against
the early critical reporting of the war, a feeling that it was time to 'get on side'
and stop helping the Reds." (Knightley, 1985, p. 346) So, under pressure to
prove their patriotism, they did get on side and went along with the military's
view of how the war should be reported for the remainder of the war.
(Knightley, 1989, pp. 355-356)
Even if relations in the field recalled the team reporting of World
War II days, there was still one important element missing: corresponding
popular support in the United States. Unlike World Wars I and II, there was
no censorship at the outlet. This development allowed for a vast array of
opinions about the war and its prosecution to appear in the print and
broadcast media regardless of the reports emanating from Korea. News
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analysis was often critical and may have contributed to the growing
unpopularity of the war. MacArthur declared that "the entire effort to distort
and misrepresent the causes leading to the existing situation represents one of
the most scandalous propaganda efforts to pervert the truth in modern
times." (Mott, 1962, p. 856) His words serve as a remarkable precursor to the
frustrating state of military-press relations found in the most controversial
war in U.S. military history, the Vietnam War (1959-1975). Vietnam
propelled a traditionally adversarial relationship into one of open
confrontation and changed the way in which the military and the press
would view each other for many decades after.
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IIL THE VIETNAM WAR: AS WATERSHED
"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American
colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a
moment, "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."
—Conversation in Hanoi, April 1975
(Summers 1982, p. 1)
A. PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS
1. Press Policy
Critics have said that "the American government became a victim of
its own propaganda" during the Vietnam War. As early as 1962, the
American embassy in Saigon had told the military advisors and others that
under no circumstances were reverses to be discussed with the press, and
additionally, official reports were to reflect a positive assessment. (Warner,
1977, p. 177). During the quieter days from 1956 to 1960 this injunction posed
no real problem as the economic and social modernizations under the
Vietnam government received very little attention from the American press.
However, as hostilities in rural areas began heating up and tension rose in
political circles in Saigon, the resident press corp began to grow—and so did
the controversy surrounding U.S. involvement. (Colby, 1989, p. 113)
Even before the air campaign Rolling Thunder and the ground war
began in 1964/65, the press, assuming its role as "the fourth estate," was
critical of the glowing reports emanating from not only Saigon, but also the
Pentagon. Press reports on the shortcomings of the Vietnamese
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counterinsurgency efforts contrasted sharply with the optimism expressed by
officials and these early seeds of controversy only grew with the escalation of
the war. (MacDonald, 1985, p. 234) Furthermore, this disparity created the
political chasm known as the "credibility gap"~"the situation in which the
American public [was] not given full credence to government
pronouncements on the war situation." (Blanchard, 1969, p. 55) This also
gave rise to allegations of "managed news." Paradoxically, from a historical
perspective, the press had never been less managed. The Vietnam War
represented the first major conflict since the nation's beginning that did not
incorporate some form of formal press censorship.
Although omission of formal censorship in Vietnam did little to
operational security—of which military censorship is designed to protect—it
had an overtly detrimental impact on strategic security. In a low intensity
conflict the enemy could not easily exploit the few breaches of operational
security; but as later illustrated by the Tet offensive, indiscriminate reporting,
no matter how factual, did not always present the whole story, nor was it
conducive to military success. When the American press corps attempted to
send their first stories of the panic they witnessed during the German counter
attack in the Ardennes in 1944, "What could have been an unholy mess,"
cabled Wes Gallagher of the A.P., "was saved by the good sense of the field
press censors." (Knightley, 1989, p. 324) Discretion, seeing through the fog of
war, is the purview of the military at such times. During Vietnam it was left
to the press. Moreover, the lack of military press controls set a precedent for
laissez-faire press coverage and fostered the journalistic belief that this should
and would always be the case.
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The move toward eliminating most military and governmental
controls in Vietnam came about for several reasons. According to Major
General Winant Sidle, who conducted a 1966 study on the feasibility of
imposing field press censorship, and who later served as Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) Chief of Information, cited four major
considerations in changing censorship policy:
1. Censorship would need to include the South Vietnamese government
(which already had a rather questionable record on press relations).
2. The technical difficulties in censoring T.V. film.
3. The lack of censorship back in the States (which could not be imposed
short of a formal declaration of war).
4. The impracticality of applying censorship to reports in Saigon when
this could easily be circumvented by leaving the combat theater to file
the story (or as in the case of Korea, expand on cleared text when filing
the story by phone). (Grossman, 1989, p. 12)
There were, however, accreditation policies and certain ground rules
by which correspondents were subject, but these were not meant to act as any
real restraint. Just two letters from any news agencies or newspapers prepared
to buy his material made it possible for anyone calling himself a free-lance
journalist to obtain a MACV card under the accreditation system in Vietnam.
(Knightley, 1989, p. 419) Visas were just as easily granted. So after the
correspondent signed an agreement agreeing to abide by a set of fifteen
ground rules dealing in the main with military security, he was on his way.
(Knightley, 1989, p. 402) General Sidle later remarked that the news media
were very cooperative regarding the ground rules and regularly sought
guidance from the MACV and other public affairs representatives to verify
that certain information could be used in their reports without violating the
rules. (Grossman, 1989, p. 13) Self-censorship had always provided the
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foundation of previous military press relations, during the Vietnam War it
was the only form of press control.
One veteran World War II correspondent actually lamented the loss
of censors; Drew Middleton wrote:
On three trips to Vietnam, I found generals and everyone else far more
wary of talking to reporters precisely because there was no censorship.
Their usual line with a difficult or sensitive question was "you must ask
the public relations people about that." The latter usually of low rank,
clammed up and the reporter and the public got less. (Knightley, 1989, p.
423)
That at times the correspondents were frustrated by the public affairs
officers lack of information or tardiness in disseminating it, had less to do
with the quality of those officers and more to do with the nature of the war
and the hesitancy of knowledgeable military officials to keep their public
affairs officers fully informed. (Grossman, 1989, p. 15) In terms of progress,
counterinsurgency operations were difficult to describe; there were no
territorial gains to graphically display, only statistical tables of body counts and
gross tonnage of bombs dropped. (Rigg, 1969, pp. 15-19) Although the official
daily briefings in Saigon;' dubbed the "five o'clock follies," were viewed with
skepticism, several noted members of the media defended the military
information officers involved. Eric Severeid, a leading correspondent at CBS
News, observed that normal and inevitable tensions existed between the
press and military in Saigon, but the mutual trust there was higher than it
was inside the Pentagon. (Metzner, 1972, p. 35)
2. Divergent Images
The Pentagon was very sensitive to the increasingly divergent images
of the war that were being presented through official sources and media
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coverage. In response, the Defense Department began a temporary program
in 1964 in which the government paid for the transportation of news
correspondents from across the country (especially from hometown news
agencies) to Vietnam. There were three stated reasons for this program: (1) to
give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of the military involvement
in Vietnam; (2) to help assure a balanced output of the scene coverage and (3)
to stimulate the media to send more experienced reporters to Vietnam under
their own sponsorship. (Managed News, 1966, p. 104). "Operations Candor"
became "Operation Backfire," for although the number of newsmen increased
from 40 to 450 by the termination of the program in mid-August 1965, many
newsmen labeled such efforts as this "managed news" and claimed that it
only served to confuse the people back home with "out of focus" report.
(Metzner, 1972, p. 33). Numerous such complaints led to Senate hearings in
late August 1966 headed by Senator J. William Fulbright, a well-known
opponent of the war, on the news coverage emanating from Vietnam.
Allegation of mismanagement ran both ways. The Pentagon was
equally critical of journalistic practices. During the Senate hearings, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mr. Sylvester, had this to say:
The interesting thing to me, Mr. Chairman, is that on the one hand, we
have complaints from our people—meaning the citizens of the United
States—directly to our office, much of it coming through congressional
offices, that we are permitting too much coverage—television, radio
—
too much detail, too much horrible material, too much telling the
enemy. On the other hand, we are being charged with not having
enough coverage. I believe these are mutually exclusive. (Metzner, 1972,
p. 34)
Furthermore, Mr. Sylvester denied that his office managed the news, placing
the burden of such practices in the news offices. He offered this observation,
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"You as a reader do not get everything that comes into the newspaper; you get
what the editor under our system of a free press and a free decision decides
that he can sell." (Metzner, 1972, p. 34) Unfortunately these "choices" were
not always complimentary to the U.S. military.
The most renowned instance of T.V. coverage upsetting to the
Pentagon was a report filed by Morley Safer on "The CBS Evening News with
Walter Cronkite" on August 5, 1965. The visual image of several old South
Vietnamese running away from the village of Cam Ne as U.S. Marines
torched their thatched roofs with cigarette lighters, was considered a poor
representation of the military operations in Vietnam by government officials.
It was horribly reminiscent of the German antipartisan warfare in Russia
1941-44, of all that Americans have seen themselves as fighting against.
Accompanying this dramatic scene was a disparaging commentary claiming
"Today's operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature." (MacDonald,
1985, p. 235)
Television found a happy union with to the crisis reporting that
came to symbolize press coverage during the war in the 1960s. This fact had
as much to do with the nature of the medium as any malicious intent by
reporters to distort the facts. Television was just starting to make a major
impact on the American political culture; its treatment of the Vietnam War
was a milestone in its development as a dominant force in American society.
"More than mere information transmission, it consists of shaping
information along explicit temporal and spatial lines"—sometimes
unintentionally. (Altheide, 1987, p. 165) An unidentified network staff
member explained television's treatment thus, "Why should I miss the big
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news stories by explaining too much? We hit hard with the visuals and leave
the broader explanation to the press." (Blanchard, 1968, p. 36) Consequently
events were chosen for their visual impact. This choice resulted in a series of
dramatic, yet often isolated and unrelated, news items. Moreover, the
brutality of war was presented as it had never been presented before. In 1968,
then Vice President Hubert Humphrey observed:
This is the first war in the nation's history that's been fought on
television, where the actors are real, where, in the quiet of your living
room, of your home, or your dormitory, wherever you may be; this
cruel, ugly, dirty fact of life and death and war and pain and suffering
comes right to you, and it isn't a Hollywood actor. (Living-Room War,
1968, p. 28)
According to a 1968 nationwide sampling of opinion conducted by
U.S. News and World Report, few people believed that their attitudes toward
the war had actually changed because of television coverage. Television
viewing did, however, affect what they believed were the "facts of the
situation." (Living-Room War, 1968, p. 28) Essentially this was the problem
—
the kaleidoscope of images provided to the public were rarely accompanied
with contextual or background information. The "big picture" was to provide
it all. This phenomenon was never more apparent than during the Tet
Offensive of 1968.
3. The Tet Offensive: Tactical Failure, Strategic Victory
The Tet Offensive began on January 30, 1968 with surprise attacks by
the North Vietnamese and Vietcong against most of South Vietnam's major
cities and towns, including a terrorist strike on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
Major offensive action took place at Hue and Khe Sanh in the following
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weeks and months. It was the most ambitious effort on the part of the North
Vietnamese to date, and the U.S. press corps was there to report the "facts."
The misinformation that emanated from Vietnam after January 30
came about as the news reporters, under competitive pressures, threw caution
aside in order to cover the unfolding drama as quickly as possible, without
waiting for the "fog" to lift in order to present a more accurate picture. This
was especially true of the wire services and their account of the attack against
the American Embassy. According to Peter Braestrup in The Big Story, the
U.S. Embassy loomed large because (1) it was American, (2) it was nearby and
(3) it was dramatic. (Braestrup, 1983, p. 118) Although both UPI and AP
originally reported that the Embassy had been occupied, the less than
dramatic truth was the raid had failed "apparently through Vietcong
confusion and the quick thinking of a Marine guard, who closed the big front
door." (Braestrup, 1983, p. 91) Such exaggerations and half truths plagued the
initial coverage, and no amount of recounting or clarification took away the
shock felt by the American public.
The Tet Offensive was a tactical failure for the North Vietnamese, for
they were unable to exploit the surprise they achieved, nor were they able to
elicit local uprisings against the South Vietnamese government. Within a
few days most of the attack had been defeated and by February 25, with the
recapture of Hue, the city fighting was finally over. It was believed that the
smaller disturbances were distractions to the more conventional interactions
that took place—especially at Khe Sahn where the fighting continued
through March. However these facts became obscured in light of what the
reporters actually saw. Braestrup recounts:
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Standing on the blood-spattered lawn of the embassy compound as dead
Vietcong snipers were being carried away, he [General Westmoreland]
repeated his assurances to newsmen: "The enemy exposed himself ...
and he suffered great casualties ... American troops went on the
offensive and pursued the enemy aggressively.
To which one reporter later remarked "The reporters could hardly believe
their ears. Westmoreland was standing in the ruins and saying everything
was great." (Braestrup, 1983, pp. 120-121)
When the American public was presented the "facts"-the gunfire,
destruction, and casualties—the result was also disbelief—disbelief in the
optimistic reports of progress that had been given by the administration for
months prior. Against the backdrop of the "urban devastation and despair"
presented by the press, any claims after the events of 1968 of "victory" had lost
their credibility. "The Americans, by their heavy use of firepower in a few
cities were implicitly depicted as callously destroying all Vietnam in order
—
in the phrase that became common—to save it." (Braestrup, 1983, p. 216)
When Water Cronkite, affected by, as much as part of, the media
coverage of Tet, concluded on February 27, 1968, that the "bloody experience
in Vietnam is to end in a stalemate," Presidential Press Secretary George
Christian remarked "the shock waves rolled through the government."
(Schandler, 1977, pp. 197-198) The wave of news and commentary
surrounding the Tet Offensive inevitably generated controversy and debate.
Issues were raised concerning U.S. policy in Vietnam, especially considering
1968 was an election year. Antiwar sentiment gained momentum. It became
politically unfeasible to grant the troop increases General Westmoreland
requested, for this only heightened the disparity between the official
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pronouncements of success over the Tet Offensive, and the persuasive
written and visual account of failure presented by the press.
By observing the impact of Tet, one can assert that the press took a
tactical defeat and turned it into a strategic victory for the North Vietnamese.
Barry Morthian of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Vietnam
aptly described the situation when he remarked, "Sometimes I think the press
has overcovered the war, almost to the point of obfuscation . . . we are too close
to the trees and we forget about the forest." Colonel Robert Rigg paralleled
his statement with this observation, "The press has overcovered continental
United States at the same time, giving hope and misleading information to
our enemy by publicizing the 'trees of minority attitudes' as against the forest
of majority opinion effort and sacrifice," (Rigg, 1969, p. 24) In light of these
observations, it would be remiss, however, not to point out the
administration had not provided a better vantage.
4. The Legacy
Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor under President Johnson,
claimed, "The massive uninhibited reporting of the complex war was
generally undistinguished and often biased," but he also admitted that the
Administration failed to present a "clear and persuasive" picture of our
involvement in Vietnam. (Schandler, 1977, p. 198) Without communicating
clear objectives and comprehensible measures of progress, there was bound to
be confusion on the part of public perceptions, and consequently, a lack of
support. The fact that there was no formal declaration of war, only
compounded the difficulties in presenting a balanced view of
counterinsurgency operations.
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There was no statistical or graphic manner to portray villages
"protected" by military pacification efforts by day, but subject to Vietcong
terrorism by night. (Rigg, 1969, p. 24) It was, however, easy graphically to
display the discord and strife of the war torn nation in the media. President
Johnson had a difficult, but not impossible, task in providing a balanced, yet
candid, appraisal of U.S. military operations. In this endeavor he failed. The
"credibility gap" that emerged became a bane to future administrations,
effecting not only the conduct of U.S. military operations, but the manner in
which potential conflicts would be presented to the American public.
Furthermore, this legacy was to have a profound impact on an already
strained military-press relationship. According to Knightley:
In Vietnam, the United States military had accepted war correspondents,
called on all ranks to give them full cooperation and assistance, fed them
on a reimbursable basis, briefed them, armed them when necessary,
defended them, drank with them, and in general, treated them like
members of the team. The military was not happy with what it got in
return. (Knightley, 1989, p. 427)
The military came away from the Vietnam War with the vague yet
discernible feeling that the press had somehow lost them the war. This post-
war conclusion was best summed up by Robert Elegant, an Asian expert and a
former Vietnam correspondent as well:
For the first time in modern history the outcome of war was determined
not on the battlefield but on the printed page and, above all, on the
television screen . . . never before Vietnam had the collective policy of the
media—no less stringent a term will serve—sought by graphic and
unremitting distortion, the victory of the enemies of the correspondents'
own side. (Knightley, 1989, p. 428)
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This appraisal is not without detractors. According to Colonel Harry
G. Summers in his treatise, On Strategy, the collapse of national will arose
from a lack of moral consensus, not from a media conspiracy. He wrote:
Certainly there were some like Salisbury who reported enemy
propaganda, but the majority of on-the-scene reporting from Vietnam
was factual—that is the reporters honestly reported what they had seen
firsthand. Much of what they saw was horrible, for that is the true
nature of war. It was the horror, not the reporting, that so influenced the
American people. (Summers, 1980, p. 39)
Regardless of this debate, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s strong
antipathy emerged between the press and the military as a result of the
Vietnam War. In the aftermath, the DOD and its supporters accused the press
of continuing to provide a distorted and negative image of the military, while
the press viewed anything and everything that dealt with the armed forces
with skepticism.
Given this hostile military-media environment, it is little wonder
that when an Atlantic Command Public Affairs Officer (PAO) advised Vice
Admiral Metcalf, Commander of the Joint Task Force during the Grenada
Operation in 1983, 'There will be no press. Do you have any problem with
this?", without thinking twice the admiral replied, "No." (Metcalf, 1991, p.
45). This decision temporarily to exclude the press during the invasion of
Grenada in 1983 signaled a new debate on the rightful wartime role of news
media in the post-Vietnam era. (Daniels, 1985. p. 97)
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B. POST-VIETNAM PRESS POLICIES
1. Grenada
The wailing of the press because it was denied advance briefing and
immediate access to the Grenada operation is like that of a child denied a
stick of candy, unaware it has a stick of dynamite.
Surprize, celerity and concentration of forces are the quintessence of
military success. A commander has a hole in his head and (a) hole in his
plan if he sacrifices secrecy. Might as well sacrifice lives. Engaging the
press while engaging the enemy is taking on one adversary too many.
—Major General John E. Murray
(Ret.), 1983
(Daniels, 1985, p. 98)
The decision to invade the tiny island nation of Grenada occurred
after a bloody military coup on October 19, 1983 left the fate of many
American medical students in very uncertain hands. Also of concern was the
possibility that the new Marxist leader, General Hudson Austin, might make
further moves toward allowing the 9000-foot Cuban-built runway to become a
prestaging base for the Soviets. By October 29, a "clear and hold" operation
had been planned and congressional leaders were briefed of the impending
invasion, but it wasn't until four hours after the invasion that President
Reagan notified the public and the press. (Daniels, 1985, p. 100)
Lingering military hostility towards the news media was raised by the
press as a significant factor in how the media coverage of the Grenada
invasion was handled, but there is no documentation to prove or disprove
this allegation. (Grossman, 1989, p. 15) The temporary exclusion of the press
seems to have stemmed more from the short trip-wire preparation of the
operation, and the need for surprise to ensure its success, than any other
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consideration. (Denniston, 1984, p. 11) In fact from the time that the joint task
force commander (CJTF-120) was first notified of the Grenada Operation until
the first troops landed, only 39 hours had elapsed. (Metcalf, 1991, p. 56)
By mid-morning of the first day, the first on-scene media event
occurred when a reporter from the Washington Post appeared on board the
flagship demanding that his copy be relayed. Confirming a "no press policy"
up the chain of command, the reporter, along with those who followed on
the second day, was denied access by the commander of the operation, Vice
Admiral Metcalf. Shortly thereafter the tables were again turned and it was
the Pentagon posing the question into the first hours of combat, "When can
you take the media?" According to Admiral Metcalf:
This transferred, from the Pentagon to me the responsibility and
authority for media policy. Lacking guidance or precedents, I established
the rules for a media presence during the combat phase of the operation.
They were:
• Safety of personnel and security of combat operations were the
primary considerations. Media must not interfere with either.
• Troops in a combat area should not be burdened with
responsibility for the safety of the media.
• The media should not be exposed to hostile fire
• If in the vicinity of troops in combat, media should be escorted by
aPAO.
• Accommodations for the media must be available, either ashore
or on board one of the ships.
(Metcalf, 1991, pp. 56-58)
When the ban on press coverage was lifted, press pools were
employed, just as in WWII and the Inchon landings in the Korean War.
Furthermore a Joint Information Bureau was established to handle the some
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400 news media representatives who were accredited to cover the Grenada
operation by the time the last official news briefing was given the press corps
on November 23, 1983. (Braestrup, 1985, pp. 100-101) There was no field press
censorship during this time; the defining aspect of the operation was the lack
of immediate access to the press.
Then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger justifies the lack of
media access on the basis that the short notice given the military in effect
overshadowed any consideration given to news coverage. During the
planning sessions it was the issues of security and safety that reigned
supreme. He went on to defend the press policy that followed the initial ban:
As soon as the evacuation was in its final stages, less than 48 hours after
the operation began, members of the press were flown into Grenada,
although sporadic fighting continued, they were given complete
freedom and the run of the island, and our total cooperation arranging
interviews (sic). We also arranged to fly press representatives back to
Barbados every day so they could file their stories, because there was no
transmission facilities on the island. (Daniels, 1985, pp. 102-103)
The press, however, was not convinced. Although a Los Angeles
Times poll conducted in November 1983 showed that 52% of the American
people approved of the news blackout, the press engaged in a journalistic
furor. (Braestrup, 1985, p. 119) A Washington Post editorial expounded:
If the ... media can be excluded by their own government from direct
coverage of events of great importance to the American people, the
whole character of the relationship between governors and governed is
affected ... This is an administration already well known for its tendency
to use the national security label to limit the flow of information to the
public in various ways. So it is perhaps not so surprizing that the
convenience of the military—or its insistence on the primacy of its
convenience—triumphed over good sense, healthy democratic practice
and the strong standing tradition of press-government cooperation in
coverage of unfolding military events. (Daniels, 1985, p. 115)
62
The story that emerged out of Grenada, and indeed, by what Grenada
is remembered most, is the story of the press. In retrospect, Vice Admiral
Metcalf had this to say:
In the actual reporting of Grenada to the U.S. public, the media
expended more column inches and time talking about their prerogatives
than in reporting the story.
... The story that was not told by the media was the one of an
operation put together in hours by forces that had never operated
together and yet were successfully controlled by a command structure
that was initiated on the spot. Most Americans are proud of what
happened in Grenada, but they do not understand why. (Metcalf, 1991, p.
58)
Was the military responsible for the inadequacy of reporting in
Grenada, or did the press fail to inform the public by elevating "Freedom of
the Press" to a cause celebre? The answer is "Yes" to both. The Vietnam
experience had altered the way in which the military and press regarded each
other. Furthermore, this experience, along with the publicity of the Pentagon
Papers and the Watergate story had created a much bolder press—insistent on
access to cover all forms of government activity. (Denniston, 1984, p. 11). In
the face of continuing media outcry, the government sought to address those
fundamental issues through the establishment of a Military-Media Relations
Panel—known as the Sidle Commission.
2. The Sidle Commission
The Military-Media Relations Panel convened for February 6, 1984 at
the National War College in Washington, DC. Then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General John W. Vessey Jr., chose retired Major General
Winant Sidle, formerly the Army's chief spokesman in Vietnam and widely
respected by the media. (Daniels, 1985, p. 128) The question posed by the CJCS
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was "How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the
lives of our military and protects the security of a military operation while
keeping the American public informed through the news media?" (CJCS
Report, 1984, p. 1)
Panel membership included four former newsmen with both print
and broadcast wartime experience, military PAOs from each of the services
and the defense department, operations spokesman from the Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and a former dean of journalism school. At
the outset a statement of principle was made: "... the panel believes it is
essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the
maximum degree consistent with mission security and the safety of the U.S.
forces." (Grossman, 1989, p. 16)
Testimony was heard from a variety of groups including news media
representatives, educators and the military establishment. Although working
journalists, representatives of major news agencies and major media groups
such as the American Society of Newspaper Publishers and the National
Association of Broadcasters declined to participate as part of the five-day
panel, they provided oral and written presentations. (Grossman, 189, p. 17)
Ten of these media groups presented the panel with their own statement of
principle. They called on top level civilian and military officials to "reaffirm
the historic principle that American journalism, print and broadcast . . . should
be present at U.S. military operations" in order for the public, through a free
press, to "be independently informed about actions of its government."
(Daniels, 1985, p. 130) Through the criticism and comments found in the
various testimony eight recommendations were made.
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The first recommendation dealt with institutionalizing public affairs
planning as part of and concurrent with operational planning. Orders would
be sent to Commanders in Chief (CINCs) directing the consideration of public
affairs aspects as soon as possible during the course of an operation.
Furthermore, the Assistant-Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) would be
informed of any impending military operations and a public affairs planning
cell in OJCS would help insure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.
(CJCS Report, 1984, p. 7)
The second and third recommendations concerned the establishment
of a media pool should operational requirements dictate such use for early
access to an operation. It was decided that the largest practical press pool
should be utilized at the minimum length of time necessary; unilateral
coverage would follow. To facilitate this a preestablished system of
accrediting pool members with provisions for constant updating would also
need to be established. This issue, however, was left to further study. (CJCS
Report, 1984, pp. 8-12)
The next four recommendations dealt specifically with military-
media planning. Using the criteria of shared responsibility, the military
would draft security guidelines during the planning process, preferably few in
number, and the basic tenet governing media access would be voluntary
compliance with the knowledge that violation would mean expulsion from
the area of coverage. Public affairs planning for military operations would
include sufficient equipment and qualified personnel (military escorts) to
assist correspondents in adequately covering the operation, and planners and
plans, if necessary and feasible, would consider media communications
requirements. Furthermore, planning would include inter and intra theater
transportation support of the media, if possible. (CJCS Report, 1984, pp. 12-14)
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The last recomendation called for various measures to improve the
military-press relationship. Measures included the establishment of an
ongoing program for top military public affairs representatives to meet with
media representatives to discuss mutual problems; an enlargement of current
media awareness programs in service schools and colleges; enhanced media
understanding through mid-level military interaction with news
organization; and the hosting by the Secretary of Defense, of a working
meeting with broadcast news representatives to explore the special
requirements and security problems of this medium, especially as concerns
possible real-time news media audiovisual coverage. (CJCS Report, 1984, p.
16)
General Sidle concluded that an adversarial relationship between the
media and the government, including the military, was healthy and helped
guarantee that both institutions would do a good job. "However" he went on
to say:
This relationship must not become antagonistic—an "us versus them"
relationship. The appropriate media role in relation to the government
has been summarized aptly as being neither that of a lap dog nor an
attack dog but, rather, a watch dog. Mutual antagonism and distrust are
not in the best interests of the media, the military, or the American
people. (CJCS Report, 1984)
Implementation of the Sidle Commission recommendations was
swift. Pentagon spokesman Michael I. Burch soon revealed that changes in
the planning procedures had already begun that would require the JCS to
input public affairs guidance in military operational plans. Along with this,
the JCS Public Affairs planning cell was soon created to review all CINC plans
to ensure these publications provisions are included. (Daniels, 1985, p. 136)
The Defense Department went on to emphasize media awareness as part of
66
officer training and by August 1984 the Secretary of Defense Media Advisory
Committee was established as part of the program for improved media
relations through regular meetings between the military and the press.
However, the best known and most controversial initiative emanating from
the Sidle Commission was that of the DOD media pool and its provisions
wherein.
3. The DOD National Media Pool
It is important to note that the media testimony during the Sidle
Commission was almost unanimous in opposition to pools, although the
report concluded that the press "would cooperate in pooling agreements if
that were necessary for them to obtain early access to an operation." (Daniels,
1985, p. 132) So it was not without some reservations that the press first
agreed to participate in the DOD National Media Pool, and not without some
reservations that they continued to participate given its precarious success
since its establishment in 1985.
The program consists of more than 40 Washington based media
organizations accredited for membership, including 26 newspapers, three
national news magazines, the three major wire services, the four major
television networks, and eight radio organizations. Pool membership rotates
on a quarterly basis and, although operational situations may dictate different
composition, it generally consists of 11 media representatives: a wire service
reporter and photographer, a television reporter and two person crew, a
magazine reporter and photographer, a radio representative and three
newspaper reporters. Two military public affairs escorts accompany the pool
until they are joined by the unified /specified command public affairs officer
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at the scene of the operation, and then members must observe whatever
groundrules had been established to support operational security
considerations. Furthermore it is the responsibility of the military to ensure
that transportation is available to quickly get the pool to the theater of
operation. Communications and logistic arrangements, as well as pool
operations in-theater are the responsibility of the unified /specified command
concerned. (Grossman, 1989, pp. 18-19)
At the outset of the DOD media pool program Burch said the pool
system would be tested in:
... mock operations in order to learn how well the system works,
whether reporters honored the security requirements and to prevent
reporters from assuming that a call from the Pentagon meant that an
actual operation is about to start. (Daniels, 189, p. 137)
There have been more than a half dozen of these media pool tests since that
time—the first, covering a 1985 exercise in Honduras. Operational
deployments include the Persian Gulf in 1987, Honduras in 1988 and Panama
in 1989. With the exception of Panama, progressive improvements were
made through all these operations since 1985 (Grossman, 1989, p. 19)
Fearing security breaches, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney delayed
the pool's departure for the US. invasion of Panama. During the first crucial
hours of the Panama invasion, pool reporters were confined to Fort Clayton
and subjected to extensive Army briefings. (Linfield, 1990, p. 159) Complaints
from reporters who were shut out of covering the operation prodded the
Defense Department's public affairs staff to admit it had botched its handling
of the press pool. In a memo to the CINCs on this subject, General Colin
Powell, CJSC, wrote that "otherwise successful operations are not total
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successes unless the media aspects are properly handled." (Woodward, 1991,
p. 194) An Army captain during Vietnam, military assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense during Grenada, General Colin Powell had learned his
media lessons from the ground up and believed that the entire military's
success relied on a mature understanding of public relations. (Woodward,
1991, p. 155) This belief, and that of the entire Bush administration, was to
guide the military-press relations during the largest U.S. military operation
since Vietnam—the Persian Gulf War—when finally, the legacy of Vietnam
was lifted from the shoulders of the military both on the battlefield and at
home.
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IV. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A. PAST AS PRELUDE
The press needs to expunge Vietnam from its soul as much as the nation
does. It should not be a cheerleader for the military, but neither should
it reflexively oppose every use of force. Each case deserves to be reputed
on its own merit.
—(Gergen, "Why America Hates the
Press/' 1991, p. 57)
Not long after television correspondents reported live on January 16,
1991, the air raids on Baghdad, President Bush addressed the nation from the
White House. The President reiterated U.S. objectives in the Gulf; moreover,
"in an effort to exorcise the demons from the past," President Bush declared
"this will not be another Vietnam... our troops... will not be asked to fight
with one hand tied behind their back." ("The Home Front," 1991, p. 25)
However, even before the actual start of war, the Bush administration sought
to avoid the political and military shortfalls of the Vietnam War. This trend
was particularly true as concerned press policy, which the President and his
advisors believed was handled poorly in Vietnam. (De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A))
Both the administration and the military in particular were haunted by
the experience of the Vietnam War and what they believed were the lessons
learned from that war. They knew that with the coming of war, it would be
on television instantly "bringing home the action, death, consequences and
emotions even more graphically than during Vietnam," "recording every
step," "complicating all military tasks." (Woodward, 1991, p. 315) With this
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troubling historical memory "that the press lost them the war in Vietnam,"
the U.S. military made a concerted effort to "limit the damage" the press
could inflict in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Similarly, the
U.S. press corps "still buoyed up by the fact that the press told the story that
the Vietnam War was being lost a couple of years before most senior officers
could bring themselves to face this conclusion/' were determined to uncover
the same story in the Gulf. ("Good News Only," 1991, p. 24) In typical
military fashion, both the U.S. military and U.S. press corps prepared
themselves to fight the last war, moreover the war that had to be waged was
with each other.
B. PREPARING FOR WAR
One thing Vietnam did to us is nobody says "Oh don't worry about
public affairs."
—Major General Winant Sidle (Ret.)
(De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A))
1. Organization
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. After nearly a week of
deliberations and consultations with other Western and Arab leaders, as well
as key members of his own administration, President Bush appeared on
national television to inform America of his decision to deploy U.S. troops in
Saudi Arabia. On August 8, he said: "The mission of our troops is not
wholely defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. The will not
initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, and other friends of the Persian Gulf." (Woodward, 1991, p. 277)
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The next day, public affairs guidance (PAG) from United States
Central Command (USCENTCOM) whose area of operation includes
Southwest Asia (SWA) advised responsible commands of appropriate media
responses and informed them of public affairs activities soon to be
implemented, i.e., the activation of the DoD News Media Pool and the
establishment of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB). The message also
encouraged internal news releases, especially audio-visual releases and
authorized direct liaison with the press between public affairs officers (PAO's)
at all levels of command with the reminder that all statements to the news
media would be on the record. (USCENTCOM, PAGSWA military operation,
090930, Aug 90) And so an offensive public affairs oriented press policy began.
Initially the host nation, Saudi Arabia, was reluctant to allow the
Western media to enter their country. The U.S. government urged the
granting of visas to U.S. reporters in order to cover the arrival of the U.S.
military. After a phone conversation with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
on 10 August, the Saudi Arabian government agreed to accept the DoD News
Media Pool while deciding the issue. That same day the pool was notified,
and by August 13 the initial pool members consisting of 17 national news
media representatives and six U.S. military escort officers arrived in Dhahran
Saudi Arabia. (DOD, An Interim Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian
Gulf Conflict, 1991, p. 19-1)
The original pool members represented the AP, UPI, Reuters, CNN,
the Los Angeles Times, Time magazine, Scripps Howard News Service, and
the Milwaukee Journal. The military was represented by all four branches of
service. The presence of the DOD News Media Pool assured that news would
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flow as quickly as possible from the area of operations—of special concern if
hostilities broke out prior to the logistical and troop buildup. "The DoD pool
spent the first week establishing lines of communications for the media to fill
their print, voice, still photography, and video reports." They assembled and
tested the CNN fly away dish and after 24 hours of military negotiations with
the Saudi government, permission was granted to uplink. Through the
pool's initial efforts, the groundwork was laid for the many journalists that
would follow. (Sherman, 1991 pp. 60-61)
Like many areas of operation the U.S. military has been involved in
over the past half century, Saudi Arabia lacked a strong communications
infrastructure. Moreover prior to the Gulf War, the Saudi Arabian
government had never issued more than 22 journalist visas a year.
However, within a week of the DOD pool's arrival, 150 news organizations
were represented in the area of operations and by December the number
exceeded 800. To accommodate this growth, the military's public affairs
people worked very closely with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Information.
The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran, and later, one in Riyadh,
were soon established to quickly coordinate a system for accreditation and
media assistance, and the Saudi Ministry was co-located with the JIB in
Dhahran to enable the news media to register with both the Saudi
government and the JIB at once. Both the JIB and the Ministry worked in
concert with each other to provide access to Saudi Arabian bases and military
units on the ground and at sea throughout the area of operations. (Sherman,
1991, p. 60) (Interim Report, 1991, p. 19-1-2)
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The JIB functioned both as news media coordinator and release
agency for not only the U.S. military but the British military and the Saudi
Ministry of Information. The bureau processed hundreds of inquiries for
routine media visits, responded to human interest and issue oriented stories,
and issued military press releases. Furthermore its personnel acted as
spokespersons for the military on talk shows and in news briefings, and
escorted the media into the field." (Sherman, 1991, p. 59) "The Saudi
government required that reporters visiting Saudi bases be escorted by a U.S.
official." (Interim Report, 1991, p. 19-2) As later discussed, military escorts
were an important organizational factor in the coverage of Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.
The JIB tried to ensure prompt and impartial responses to
correspondents' queries, but given the magnitude of the unilateral coverage
that dominated after the DOD media pool was disbanded on 26 August, this
was a difficult task. The JIB worked round the clock to accommodate the
more than 1600 news media representatives that eventually amassed to cover
the war. Still, according to the Secretary of the Navy's Special Assistant for
Public Affairs, Captain Mike Sherman:
One essential principle remained intact:
No one got unilateral coverage of a major "first" that meant no scoops.
Information flow to the American public was deemed more important
than competition in the marketplace. (Sherman, 1991, pp. 56-61)
This principle no doubt weighed heavily in the decision to organize battle
coverage under officially sanctioned pools.
"There's a huge gaggle of reporters out there, and the press has
absolutely no capacity to police itself," remarked Secretary of Defense Dick
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Cheney. "There was no way we were ever going to put 100 percent of the
reporters who wanted to go cover the war out with the troops." (DeParle,
1991, p. 8(A) This became apparent as early as October when the Pentagon
sent a joint public affairs team on 6 October to evaluate the public affairs
aspects of the war. The team concluded,
that given the time and distances involved, the probable speed of the
advance of U.S. forces, the potential for the enemy to use chemical
weapons, and the sheer violence of a large-scale armor battle would
make open coverage of a ground combat operation impractical, at least
during the initial phase. (Interim Report, 1991, p. 19-2)
Although "the strain on communications and logistics was
considerable, a plan for combat pool coverage was conceived by both the
military and the press that would place "130 journalists in pools to units in
the field. (Braestrup, 1991, p. xii) The pool concept as it was "hammered out"
by Pentagon officials and Washington Bureau chiefs, allowed reporters "to be
assigned to different units where they would be accompanied by a military
escort charged with assuring their personal safety and making sure that their
copy got back to the rear." (Fialka, 1991, p. 14) The bureau chiefs in
Washington helped establish many of the pool rules and "backed up by the
Pentagon," were able to raise the final number of reporters in the field to 192
in the final hours before the ground war started. (Fialka, 1991, pp. 9, 15)
The JIB in the Dhahran International relayed what slots were
available and then the news organizations themselves coordinated the matter
of who went out in the field. The news media had organized themselves into
four media pools to facilitate the selection process. Reporters registered with
the print, radio, TV or picture pools," and once they worked up to the top of
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the lists maintained by pool coordinators, were eligible to go out in the field
to serve in the combat pools set up and managed by U.S. forces." At that
point the JIB issued equipment and an escort officer to jet them out of the
division. (Fialka, 1991, pp. 34-36)
The escorts played an important role in both Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. They acted as liaison between the reporters and the troops and were
instrumental in maintaining operational security. One of General
Schwarzkopf's aides, Captain Widermuth, explained: "You needed an escort
to provide a liaison with the units. That military guy speaks military. It's just
smart." (DeParle, 1991, p. 8(A)) Moreover the escorts were there to prevent
inadvertent violations of operational security—especially during the war
when copy was subject to security review. They, like the press policies that
guided them, had to balance the needs of operational security with the
public's right to know.
This perpetual dilemma had been aptly described by General
Eisenhower in 1944:
The first essential in military operations is that no information of value
shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and
broadcasting is wide open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to
reconcile those sometimes diverse consideration. (Interim Report, 1991,
19-1)
It was to this endeavor that the press policy of the Persian Gulf War was
created.
2. Press Policy
Military press policy in the Persian Gulf War was a carefully thought
out, thorough process. One government official observed: "The sense was,
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'set it up over there, pay attention to it—don't have things happen by
accident, take control of it.'" (De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A)) By August 14 the chief
blueprint for Desert Shield's public information policy had been created—
a
ten-page classified document known as Annex Foxtrot. Observed reporter
Jason De Parle of the New York Times: "The drafting of Annex Foxtrot was
one step in a long step of decisions that, by the war's end, left the government
with a dramatically changed policy on press coverage of military operations."
(De Parle, 1991, p. 1)
Annex Foxtrot provided specific public affairs guidance and tasking,
as well as a conceptual understanding of the importance and the purpose of
military public affairs activities conducted in support of Operation Desert
Shield. Although much of the message was administrative, it contained
several key principles central to military press strategy. It stated: "DoD policy
in this operation requires taking an active approach to informing the
American and international publics. Every effort will be made to disseminate
accurate, complete and timely information to the public through the news
media to the maximum extent possible consistent with operational security."
[author's italics] Furthermore, this active public affairs program was "to
convey" to its audience "the resolve of the United States government to
protect its regional interests ... [and] to illustrate U.S. forces abilities to deter
and defend and if necessary fight and defeat enemy forces." [italics mine]
(USCENTCOM ANNEX F, 140800Z AUG 90, p. 3)
The press policy explicitly delineated what was expected of
participating units and from news media representatives. Media
representatives were to receive, at a minimum "daily, comprehensive and
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unclassified" operational briefs and reasonable access to key personnel.
Although the message specifically stated that pool access extended to combat
areas and that news media representatives were to be treated as members of
the unit, commanders were also told to ensure that the "unarmed, untrained
reporters are not recklessly put in exposed situations." Most important,
media representatives were to be "escorted at all times, repeat at all times" by
public affairs escorts and would be granted no access to classified materials or
secure areas. Cooperation from all participating forces would be given on a
not to interfere basis. (USCENTCOM, ANNEX F, 140800Z AUG 90, p. 4-5)
Nonetheless military planning did authorized media representatives
military travel inter and intra theater if commercial means were not
available. Moreover, the "high priority" of this DoD requirement was only to
be compromised by "critically needed operational transportation." Messing
and billeting were to be made available in the same manner—except on a
reimbursable basis. Barring interference with critical operational
communications, the media was also authorized use of military facilities,
including courier service. Medical care and appropriate equipment, i.e.
helmets, chemical protection gear were also authorized as part of military
press support. Of course, to gain this support news media representatives first
had to be accredited. (USCENTCOM ANNEX F, 140800Z AUG 90, p. 7)
The accreditation policy outlined on Annex Foxtrot was relatively
simple and followed the same premises as previous wars. News media
representatives were required to demonstrate association with a recognized
media organization in order to facilitate access to the area of operations and
releasable information. Military support was also contingent upon media
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members' agreement to general guidelines and specific ground rules as laid
out by DoD. Media representatives were advised that although restrictions
would be kept to a minimum, commanding officers could dictate such actions
consistent with the security of an operation. (USCENTCOM ANNEX F,
140800Z AUG 90, p. 6-8)
The ground rules themselves were based on the principle of
maximum information flow to the public at minimum risk to the safety or
security of the armed forces. There were seven general categories or
information not releasable and eight specifically dealing with air, ground, or
sea operations in the event of hostilities. General information regarding
"military plans, activities or operations (actual or hypothetical)" was
restricted, detailed information on "command, control, personnel,
operational or support vulnerabilities." Specific information on targeting
and aircraft points of origin was also forbidden. In all categories security at
the source was the guideline. (USCENTCOM ANNEX F, 140800Z AUG 90, p.
9)
These ground rules were modified by the Pentagon before the actual
commencement of hostilities in January after many meetings with the news
media. (Woodward, 1991, p. 368) The twelve new rules, listed on a single
page, also dealt with matters of operational security; however, further
delineations were made concerning the descriptive terms that were or were
not acceptable for media coverage. Unit size could only be described in
general terms such as "multibattalion" or "multidivision." To prevent
tactical advantage to the enemy, details of battle damage or losses to U.S. or
coalition forces could not be reported until released by CENTCOM; until then,
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damage and casualties would be described as "light," "moderate" or "heavy."
According to Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
The ground rules were not intended to prevent journalists from
reporting on incidents that might embarrass the military or to make
military operations look sanitized. Instead they were simply and solely
to prevent publication of details that could jeopardize a military
operation or endanger the lives of U.S. troops. (Williams, the Persian
Gulf, the Pentagon, the Press, 1991, pp. 11-12)
Additional guidelines for the media were constructed to encompass
the change in operations from a peaceful buildup to actual hostilities. The
press were reminded about military casualty policies, light discipline
restrictions for night operations, and that they would be responsible for their
own professional gear. Specific guidelines relating to the operation of the
combat pool system were also delineated. Pool products were subject to
security review before release to insure "its conformance to the attached
ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause
embarrassment." There was no field press censorship:
The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss
ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited
circumstances when no agreement can be with a reporter about disputed
materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for
review by the JIB director and the appropriate news media
representative. If no agreement can be reached the issue will be
immediately forwarded to OASD (PA) for review with the appropriate
bureau chief. The ultimate decision in publication will be made by the
originating reporter's news organization. (USCENTCOM "Ground Rules
and Guidelines, 160800Z JAN 91)
According to Pete Williams these ground rules and guidelines were
based upon those developed in 1942 during World War II, "at those handed
down by General Eisenhower's chief of staff for the reporters who covered the
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D-Day landings, and at the ground rules established by General MacArthur for
covering the Korean War." He also was quick to add reporters in those wars
were subject to a military censor whose decision was final. In the Persian
Gulf it was the military who had to appeal to the journalists, "the final
decision to publish or broadcast was in the hands of the journalists not the
military." (Williams, "The Press and the Persian Gulf War," 1991, pp. 5-6)
Nonetheless accusations of censorship were made in the Gulf War
even before the war and this system of security review began. The creation of
media pools, hampering their independent movement, "Seemed to many
reporters to have been designed to withhold information, rather than
provide access to good information." (Smith, 1991, p. 135) This view that the
military was hiding something was further exacerbated by the escort policy of
both Desert Shield and Desert Storm and, in fact, in the early stages of
coverage, most of the complaints centered around the use of military escorts.
Critics said this decision fundamentally affected the coverage of military
operations by "transforming the escort into a permanent part of the news
gathering process." (De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A)) In the Wall Street Journal on 30
August 1990, Michael Gartner, president of NBC news editorialized:
Here's something you should know about the Gulf: much of the news
that you read or hear or see is being censored ... There is no excuse for
this kind of censorship [which] exceeds the most stringent censorship of
World War II.
He went on to remark that the Press was shut out of Grenada, "cooped up in
Panama, and put on the plane late into Saudi Arabia," and concluded that
once again the Pentagon had no use for the "facts." (Braestrup, 1991, p. 20)
Nothing could have been further from the mark.
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Secretary of Defense Cheney said he was guided by two overarching
principles in the development of Persian Gulf press policy. One was that
military needs would come before journalistic rights—thus disregarding the
"lore" of past practice. The other concerned the protection of government
credibility. He explained: "There was ample precedent that one of the really
great ways to screw up an operation—certainly was the lesson learned in
Southeast Asia—is don't get out there making claims you can't back up," (De
Parle, 1991, p. 8(A))
The Bush administration desperately wanted to avoid falling into the
credibility gap left as the legacy of the Johnson administration. Instead of
withholding information, the Bush administration did its best to bring the
facts about national security and defense strategy to the foreground. President
Bush's demeanor—his "stable manner" and "calm sincerity" helped persuade
the country to support his stated goals in the Gulf. (Zuckerman, 1991, p. 72)
Nonetheless, much to his consternation, support for Operation Desert Shield
began waning by early November.
3. National Will
In a press conference on November 8, 1990, President Bush informed
the American public of his plans to increase the size of U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf. He said this commitment was made "to ensure that the
coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that to be
necessary to achieve our goals." Shortly thereafter a poll published in USA
Today headlined "Bush Support Slim" stated that only 51% of the American
public approved of his handling of the Gulf crisis, down from 82% approval
three months prior. (Woodward, 1991, p. 325) The chasm of President
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Johnson's Credibility Gap loomed large once more. President Johnson had
for a long time sought to hide the extent of American military build up in
Vietnam, and although President Bush and his chief advisors had
forewarned of possible troop increases, the speed at which support for the
Gulf seemed to be unraveling warranted further measures to prevent falling
into the same pit.
The President began to focus again on the fundamental issues that
had brought the nation to the brink of war—most notably the hostage issue
and the more than 100 Americans being used as "human shields" at Iraqi
military and industrial installations. (Woodward, 1991, p. 315-316) Moreover,
recalling that President Johnson had made the grave error of not formally or
officially obtaining a Congressional mandate during Vietnam, beyond the
highly controversial Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Bush began to
lobby Congress for approval. On January 12, 1991, three days before the
United Nations deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait expired,
Congress granted Bush the authority to go to war, referencing the "all
necessary means" language of the original U.N. resolution but also
specifically authorizing "use of military force." (Woodward, 1991, p. 362)
According to Colonel Summers in On Strategy:
A declaration of war is a clear statement of initial public support which
focuses the nation's attention to the enemy. (Continuation of this initial
public support is, of course, contingent on the successful prosecution of
war aims.) (Summers, 1982, p. 21)
President Bush had seen to the initial support. "He called up the reserves,
secured the assent of Congress and the support of the United Nations, defined
the objective, fixed a decisive strategy, and was prepared to use maximum
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force." (Braestrup, 1991, p. xi) The war had thus become a "shared
responsibility of both the government and the people." (Summers, 1982, p. 22)
It was now up to the military to carry forward this support in pursuit of the
administration's foreign policy objectives. This goal was accomplished by
performing quickly and brilliantly on the battlefield and in front of the
camera. Vietnam had taught the military it must do both. (Gergen, "Why
America Hates the Press, 1991, p. 57)
C COVERING THE WAR
1. Taking the Offensive
It was important to both the Administration and the military that the
military should run the war. Having internalized many lessons from
Vietnam, this last lesson—"send enough force to do the job and don't tie the
hands of the commanders"—reigned up until the very end of the war.
(Woodward, 1991, p. 307) With some 250,000 troops at his disposal, the
largest military deployment since Vietnam, the Commanding General
Norman Schwarzkopf would not be second-guessed by anxious civilians in
Washington unlike his counterparts in Vietnam. "General Schwarzkopf,
facing a host of imponderables, wanted maximum feasible control over all
aspects of Desert Shield /Desert Storm, including media coverage." (Braestrup,
1991, p. xi) His wishes were granted.
Although Captain Wildermuth, who drafted Annex Foxtrot, had not
directly consulted with General Schwarzkopf, he said the rules reflected
General Schwarzkopf's general philosophy. Early on when the press
complained that the escorted visits to commands were infrequent, public
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affairs officials maintained that the presence of reporters would distract from
war preparations. Yet under the military's own Hometown News Program
about 960 journalists were flown in, on military aircraft, for up to four nights
in the field with their hometown units. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel
Michael Cox, who ran the program, explained "If they know that they're
getting a free ride and they know they can't afford the $2000 ticket, there's
probably going to be a tendency to say, 'We'll do good stuff here.'" In contrast,
when the Pentagon suggested giving the major news organizations more
time in the field, General Schwarzkopf vetoed it. (De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A)) It
appeared as though General Schwarzkopf's sensitivities from Vietnam were
showing though. He shared the views of many senior military officials: "the
press could not be trusted; biased journalism had turned the public against
the Vietnam effort; and, if given half a chance, newspeople, especially ratings-
hungry television people, would portray the military in a bad light."
(Braestrup, 1991, p. xi)
For fifteen years prior to the outbreak of the war, the Department of
Defense endured articles and commentaries criticizing the Pentagon
bureaucracy: "the slowness of the decision making process, interservice and
intraservice rivalries, weakness in the procurement system and 'gold plating'
of the research and development programs." The press was "convinced that
the American military weapons systems were much more expensive than
they needed to be, and would not work well under the stress of combat."
(Smith, 1991, p. 24) However, what the American people heard and saw
during the Gulf were well trained warriors and high tech systems that worked
rather well. Public confidence soared. Observed one journalist:
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The U.S. military roared into the Gulf ready to overwhelm not only the
enemy but the press ... In recent years, the War Colleges have trained
officers to become so media-savvy that when commanders like Gen. H.
Norman Schwarzkopf took on reporters, it was no contest. The military
also knew that pictures dominate words on TV, and was ready to win on
that front, too, releasing a series of videos that captivated the public and
made the accompanying press reports seem negative and nitpicking. It
was the smartest PR offensive the Pentagon has ever mounted. (Gergen,
"Why American Hates the Press," 1991, p. 57)
The press should not have been surprized by the military's
retaliation. It was "a picture perfect demonstration of how those who bear the
sword may also perish by it." This adage was especially true of the Gulf
briefings. (Andrews, 1991, p. 83) Henry Allen, writing in the Washington
Press provided a comical illustration of the conduct of journalists in the Gulf
briefings. He wrote:
The Persian Gulf press briefings are making reporters look like fools, nit-
pickers, and egomaniacs; like dilettantes who have spent exactly none of
their lives on the end of a gun or even a shovel; dinner party
commandoes, slouching inquisitors, collegiate spitball artists; people
who have never been in a fist-fight much less combat; a whining, self-
righteous, upper-middle-class mob jostling for whatever tiny flakes of
fame may settle on their shoulders like some sort of Pulitzer Prize
dandruff." (Andrews, 1991, p. 84)
When a Saturday Night Live sketch lampooned the press for badgering the
military with often intrusive and sometimes inane questions, even wavering
White House officials were won over by the press policies in the Gulf, and the
President was that much more certain the public was on their side. (De Parle,
1991, p. 8(A))
2. Taking the Defensive
According to Major General Perry Smith, a CNN military analyst
during the war "One of the interesting aspects of the press coverage of this
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war was the slowness some journalists displayed in understanding what was
going on." He went on to note that "critical comments continued to appear
long after it had been proven to the average citizen that high technology was
in fact a routine achievement." (Smith, 1991, pp. 23-24) And there was still
skepticism over President Bush's prediction that the war would be over in a
matter of days and that U.S. casualties would be low, maybe only 500 dead—if
this was so, "why then did the Pentagon order 16,099 body bags?", asked
members of the press. (Gergen, "Instant TV War," 1991, p. 63)
Basically, the splendid performance of the U.S. military caught the
American media "flat footed." Peter Andrews, a National Defense
Correspondent, asserted "With few exceptions military beats had been poorly
covered for years. There was always room for a five hundred dollar hammer
story but very little about the people who were going to be responsible for any
future military action." (Andrews, 1991, p. 85) Photographer Brian Wolfe
blamed it on poor research: "It took the media too long to learn how all the
military equipment works. And there's no reason why they couldn't have
done this before the war." (Wolfe, 1991, p. 67) Bill Kovach, curator of the
Neiman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University simply stated:
"We covered the politics of the military, but not its mission." (Andrews, 1991,
p. 85)
According to Peter Braestrup,
with the end of the draft in 1972 and the influx of women into
journalism, the culture cap between journalists and the U.S. military
had widened greatly since Vietnam. Increasingly, tactics, logistics,
weaponry, and military language had become as foreign to most
American reporters—and the lower-echelon bosses—as the basics of
American football were to say, Kuwaitis.... If as some critics were later to
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claim, journalists were bamboozled by the military, many were as much
victims of ignorance and their own short attention spans as of
manipulations. (Braestrup, 1991, pp. vii-xiii)
Indeed, the journalist felt as though the military had somehow
tricked them into relinquishing some of their editorial purview, and some
hid behind the First Amendment, accusing the military of "controlling the
words and images of the battlefield" to the detriment of the "truth."
(Galloway, 1991, p. 49) "Discounting the self importance and self interests of
such claims," it is important to remember that
the citizens of a democracy do have a right to know what war is like, and
whether its horrors are worse than the alternative. A dutiful press that
merely regurgitates what it is told is useless, in the field and at home....
[nonetheless] war is an aberration. While it lasts the practice of
democracy is obscured, just as the view of battle is restricted from any
one part of the field." ("The War on Screen," 1991, p. 18)
It was to this "obscured," "restricted." view that some members of the
press focused; they complained that the U.S. military was intentionally
obstructing the full view of the war. Pool reports were criticized for failing to
provide the pieces of the big picture on the battlefield, and the system was
blamed for the failure. Nicholas Horrock, Washington bureau chief for the
Chicago Tribune and pool coordinator for most of the air and ground war,
remarked, "The pool reports that did come in were absolute mumbo jumbo."
(Fialka, 1991, p. 40)
The press did not seem to realize that such is the nature of a fast-
paced desert tank war. Desert warfare coverage during World War II did not
fare much better, unilaterally or otherwise. World War II correspondent
Alan Morehead wrote:
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From the first to the last we never "saw" a battle in the desert, "we were
simply conscious of a great deal of dust, noise and confusion. The only
way we could gather a coherent picture was by driving hard from one
headquarters and by picking up the reports from the most forward units
as they came through over the radio telephone. Then, when the worst
was over, we went forward ourselves to observe the prisoners and the
booty and to hear the individual experiences of the soldiers." (Knightley,
1989, p. 308)
Not pressed by the capability to instantaneously transmit their story,
World War II reporters could afford to wait until the dust had settled so to
speak, to learn the story, to file their copy. Not so in the Gulf. There were
numerous complaints about the slow and haphazard military courrier system
during the ground war, and although some of these allegations were true, it
must be remembered that this phase of the War only lasted 100 hours—not
very much time to work through logistical and communication problems.
Correspondent John Fialka remarked, "worst of all we faced a jury-
rigged system to get our copy, film, audio, and videotape back. Civil War
reporters, using the new high technology of the telegraph, were able to send
reports of the Battle of Bull Run to New York in 27 hours." (Failka, 1991, p. 5)
Interesting he chose the Civil War analogy: "Early indications of Northern
superiority had sent the Northern war corresondents hurrying back to
Washington to write accounts of a great victory. Back on the battlefield, the
Southern troops turned the Union Army and a rout followed." (Knightley,
1989, p. 26) Battlefields are confusing, speculative places. Rapid information
dissemination is not always the most accurate or even pertinent—as events
take place so quickly the importance of one event may be displaced by
another.
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The media in the Gulf claimed that they were there to record history,
yet history has no deadlines to make. Seasoned newsman Walter Cronkite
saw no need for news to come instantaneous from the battlefield: "I don't see
what this rush to print or this rush to transmit is all about. It doesn't really
matter in a wartime situaition, if we learn something this minute ... or the
next." (Keene, 1991, p. 67) Moreover the American public didn't mind a little
wait either.
D. PUBLIC OPINION
For more then six months, the American press has knocked itself out to
cover the Persian Gulf crisis, eager to meet a ravenous public appetite for
every picture, every briefing, every morsel from the front ... and what
does the press have to show for it? Mostly a big black eye.
—David Gergen, U.S. News and
World Report,"(Gergen, "Why
America Hates the Press," 1991, p.
57)
David Gergen expressed the sentiment of many reporters during the Gulf
War, mainly because, as Pete Williams observed, "Some of the critics of the
press view the relationship between the military and the press as a zero-sum
game: if military credibility is up, then press credibility is down." (Williams,
"The Press and the Persian Gulf War," 1991, p. 2) Yet a Times-Mirror poll
taken January 25, 27, 1991 found that eight out of ten Americans gave the
press high marks for its war coverage. It also concluded that 78% of the
American public felt that the military was as candid as it could be about it at
that time. (Fialka, 1991, p. 69)
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If the public disliked anything about the press, it was their seeming
inability to appreciate the same candor that the public saw. Letters poured
into the Pentagon expressing concern over this matter: "Would you please
ask reporters to give their names when they ask questions? Then we can
write to their employers and tell them to buzz off." (Williams, "The Press and
the Persian Gulf War," 1991, p. 3) While the military viewed the probing
questions as fair game, again, expressing the sentiments of David Gergen, "no
public forum about the war seems to end without a denunciation of whining
reporters badgering the military with goofy questions." (Gergen, "Why the
Military Hate the Press," 1991, p. 57)
According to CCN military analyst during the war, MAJ GEN Perry
Smith, "Clearly, leaders of various television and radio networks, of
newspapers and magazines, and professors of journalism need to address a
fundamental question: How are they going to deal with paradigm shifts?"
Smith asserts that the media has been a "captive of their own culture," that it
was their beliefs that the military and government could not be trusted and
would try to "manipulate the news in their favor," that created disfavor
among the public. (Smith, 1991, pp. 151-152) Moreover, if it had been a
contest of credibility, the military would have won, as shown by
overwhelming majorities backing the military over the press in public
opinion polls at the time. (De Parle, 1991, p. 8(A))
In a Washington Post-ABC poll taken shortly after the war, 88% of those
surveyed thought the military had gained respect during the war, up from
only half that amount of public confidence a decade prior. This rise in
credibility was partly attributed to the policies of government leaders to wait
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for confirmed reports, saying only what was known to be true, and not getting
ahead of its successes. (Williams, "The Persian Gulf, the Pentagon, the Press,"
1991, p. 10) The other part came through a genuine affection for the
American military and their mission.
In the Gulf War, the U.S. military consisted of an all-volunteer force,
with reservists from throughout the United States; the American public
wanted to be proud of their fighting force, wanted the high tech weapons to
work, wanted to punish the aggressor, wanted, perhaps, as much as the
military, to erase Vietnam from the American psyche. The coverage of the
Gulf War allowed the American public to do just that.
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V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE PERSIAN GULF
Facts must be convincing, demonstrated, living salesmen of practical
benefits. These are the only kind of facts that mold public opinion and
channel the vibrant tensions of public thinking always deciding issues in
the end, altering military policy as surely as defeat in war—they make
public opinion the most powerful tool of all, more powerful even that
the war itself.
—an anonymous Air Force officer
(Cater, 1959, p.66)
A. A FORCE MULTIPLIER
The importance of words as weapons is well demonstrated throughout
the history of military-press relations. President Roosevelt knew this during
World War II, as well as President Johnson realized it only too late in
Vietnam. The press continues to play an all too important role as either a
force multiplier or a force divider and it is the responsibility of the
government during times of war to ensure that it is the former. (Howell,
1991, p. 149) President Bush and those military and government officials
beneath him sought to fulfill the premise that once committed to war, its
success is foremost. "The circumstances of the Gulf make this premise easy to
accept":
The democracies with troops in the region had had a full five months to
weigh the risk of horrors ahead. The issues were widely debated.
National parliaments voted. The operation had been blessed by the
United Nations. Jaw-jaw was open and thorough; war-war, as an option
was never concealed. [That its time came] "oppositions, against all their
instincts, rightly suspend the normal play of democratic argument."
("War on Screen," 1991, p. 18)
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The media, too, must suppress their instincts during war, and if the past
is any indicator, it sometimes needs a little help. After all "the press tends to
go to extremes, and the responsible press exhibits extremism in pursuit of
truth—which is a virtue. It wants to know everything. It wants to know
now." (Goulding, 1970, p. xii) The press policy that emanated from the Gulf
War was not meant to change the nature of a free press, just curb its natural
tendencies in pursuit of another goal—the war effort. War may be an
aberration, but it can also be a legitimate foreign policy tool in support of
national security objectives. The Gulf War demonstrated it, the American
public acknowledge it and the press, begrudgingly, learned to respect it.
However, judging by the mixed reaction to the media coverage of the Gulf
War on the part of the press and the military, next time may be different.
B. CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
In early May 1991, editors from 15 major news organizations complained
to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney about the coverage of the Gulf War. In a
letter, they asserted that "virtually all major news organizations agree that the
flow of information was blocked, impeded, or diminished by the policies and
practices of the Department of Defense." Furthermore the letter stated,
"These conditions meant we could not tell the public the full story of those
who fought the nation's battle." They berated the system of military escorts
and copy review and claimed that "the pool system was used in the Persian
Gulf not to facilitate news coverage but to control it." ("15 Top Journalists see
Cheney and Object to Gulf War Curbs," 1991, p. 1(A))
94
Even as the newsmen feared that the coverage in the Gulf would serve as
a model for the future, in separate interviews with Dick Cheney and White
House Chief of Staff, John Sununu, that is proudly what they called it. "There
was never an effort not to give information out," said John Sununu. "There
was never an effort not to focus on things." And Mr. Cheney, "The policies
chief architect" added: "There was better coverage, more extensive coverage,
more elaborate coverage, greater knowledge on the part of the American
public about this war as it unfolded, than any other war in history." (De Parle,
1991, p. 8(A)) President Bush agreed: "I think the American people stand
behind us. I think they felt they got a lot of informaiton about the war." (De
Parle, 1991, p. 8(A))
Presenting two dissimilar views, the press and military/government
officials began a series of talks over the following year in order to come to a
better understanding regarding future press policies. During this time there
was a lot of self-evaluation on both sides of the issue. The Secretary of
Defense agreed to receive a joint report by the news organizations and the
Pentagon public affairs people in early 1992, with recommendations for the
type of ground rules that might be necessary for the press in future U.S.
miliary conflicts. (Willis, 1991, p. 22)
Reporters and military officials were basically divded into two camps:
"Those who believed tha problems encountered during the Gulf War were
mainly technical and could be resolved by negotiation, and those who saw the
Gulf experience as a symptom of a deeper mistrust and national tension
between the press and the military. (Willis, 1991, p. 221) Even Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, Pete Williams, admitted "We could have done a
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better job of helping reporters in the field." However, Mr. Williams, and
other militlary/government officials, are a far cry from admitting that the
coverage of the war was a failure. He feels "We must improve on the
system." (Williams, "The Press and the Persian Gulf, 1991, p. 8)
It has been made easier for the military to hold its position by virtue of
the strong public opinion on their side. By the press' own admission, they
know this to be true also:
Americans felt, correctly that they were receiving more information
than in any other military engagement in our history and were
comfortable with the notion that military briefings had to be sketchy to
avoid helping the enemy. They understood that in an air war, direct
physical access by the media-network TV in the cockpit of a single Stealth
fighter?~is virtually impossible as informaiton is difficult to acquire and
more difficult to obtain. (Zuckerman, 1991, p. 72)
C THE FUTURE
Media complaints over the Gulf coverage continue to focus on the
fundamental issue always affecting military-press relations: security vs.
access, and as adjunct in this war, security vs. speed. Afterall, "this was the
first U.S. war to be covered by news media who were capable of broadcasting
instantaneously to the world, included the enemy, and its not likely to be the
last. (Interim Report, 1991, p. 19-1)
This in mind, the "Statement of Principles" that were recently agreed to
by the Pentagon and the news media concerning future news coverage of
combat contained a fundamental disagreement that could not be bridged. The
military would not abrogate the option for security review, both as a process
of identifying security violations and of slowing the dissemination of such
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information, while the news media representatives felt that their integrity
made prior security review "unnecessary and unwarranted." (American
Security for Newspaper Editors (ASNE) "Statement of Principles," 1992)
The remaining principles were not much changed from those of the Sidle
Commission, or even the guidelines of the Operation Desert Storm. "Open
and independent reporting" was reaffirmed as the primary principle,
followed by agreement that pool coverage might sometimes be necessary.
(ASNE "Statement of Principles," 1992) In the Gulf, the sheer numbers of
correspondents and the type of warfare—possibly chemical—rendered
unilateral coverage implausible. According to Pete Williams,
In this sense, it was like something from a previous war—D-Day. It is
useful to remember that 461 reporters were signed up at the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to cover D-Day. Of that
number, only 27 U.S. reporters actually came ashore with the first wave
of forces. (Williams, "The Press and the Persian Gulf War," 1991, p. 7)
Military escorts, too, were given their place in the new set of principles,
stating, "military public affairs officers should act as liaisons, but should not
interfere with the reporting process." In general, the list of statements
appeared to reaffirm present policy, with the possible exception of the military
allowing communications systems operated by news organizations on to the
battlefield. But even this was subject to some restrictions. (ASNE,
"Statement of Principles," 1992) No doubt this military concession had a great
deal to do with the military's continued assertion that military review should
remain as an option. Given the record of the past, the prospects for future
technological breakthroughs in communications, and the inherent agressive
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nature of the press, security review may and probably should play a role in
future media coverage of war.
The new "Statement of Principles" adhered to the adage "everything old
is new again" and reflected only incremental changes to the Persian Gulf
policies—which by most accounts worked not only to inform the American
public, but to safeguard operational and strategic security. Current press
policies, as a product of historical evolution, incorporated the lessons of the
past, particulary those of Vietnam, and now those from the Gulf War, in
order to best balance press freedoms against the legitimate governmental
function of providing national security. Moreover, if "Freedom of the Press"
is guaranteed "not for the benefit of reporters," as news correspondent Dan
Rather asserts, but "for the benefit of listeners, and viewers, and readers, the
cause is America," then in support of this cause, freedom of the press may at
times have to give deference to national security concerns. (Powe, 1990, p.
285) This is especially important on the battlefield, when operational and
strategic security dictate the greatest consideration. This was true in Vietnam,
true in the Persian Gulf, and will remain an important element in the success
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